

Chapter 36

Evidentiary Issues That Are Likely To Arise at Trial

36.1. *Introduction*

General rules of evidence applicable in civil cases are also controlling in criminal cases. This chapter's discussion of evidentiary matters will be limited to a few of the most important problems specific to criminal trials. For other evidentiary issues, *see* DAVID P. LEONARD, EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, DAVID H. KAYE, DAVID E. BERNSTEIN & JENNIFER L. MNOOKIN, *THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE* (2d ed. 2009); JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET BERGER, *WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE MANUAL: A GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, BASED ON WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE* (10th ed. 2015); EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, PAUL C. GIANNELLI, FRANCIS A. GILLIGAN & FREDRIC I. LEDERER, *COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE* (5th ed. 2011); RICHARD O. LEMPert, SAMUEL R. GROSS, JAMES S. LIEBMAN, JOHN H. BLUME, STEPHAN LANDSMAN & FREDRIC I. LEDERER, *A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE: TEXT, PROBLEMS, TRANSCRIPTS AND CASES* (4th ed. 2011); KENNETH S. BROUN, GEORGE E. DIX, EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, DAVID H. KAYE, ROBERT P. MOSTELLER, E.F. ROBERTS & ELEANOR SWIFT, *MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE* (7th ed. 2013); ANDRE A. MOENSSENS, BETTY LAYNE DESPORTES & STEVEN D. BENJAMIN, *SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES* (7th ed. 2017); Brandon L. Garrett & Gregory Mitchell, *The Proficiency of Experts*, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 901 (2018).

36.2. *Relevance; Probative Weight Versus Prejudice*

The initial inquiry with respect to the admissibility of any piece of evidence is its relevance (that is, pertinency to the issues) and its materiality (that is, the weight of its probative contribution to resolution of the issues).

36.2.1. *Relevance Generally*

The Federal Rules of Evidence contain the following definition of "relevant evidence," which is echoed in many state statutes and local rules: "Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action" (FED. RULE EVID. 401).

The application of this rule to a particular item of evidence requires two inquiries:

First, it is necessary to identify what facts (often called "factual propositions") are "of consequence to the determination of the action" (that is, to the decision of the issues framed for trial). This inquiry is technically known as an inquiry into "materiality," and the factual propositions identified are known as "material facts." The process of identifying them begins with an analysis of the pleadings – that is, in a criminal case, the indictment or other charging paper and the defendant's plea – in the light of the rules of substantive law defining the elements of the offenses charged and the defenses asserted. (If the substantive rules are disputed, the judge will have to resolve the dispute in order to identify the material facts in issue.) The process then

takes account of the impact of any pretrial proceedings or earlier trial proceedings upon the issues framed by the pleadings.

Second, it is necessary to inquire whether the particular item of evidence has *probative force* in regard to any material fact – that is, whether it has a *logical tendency to establish or negate the truth of such a fact*. Federal Rule 401(a) sets a relatively low threshold for the amount of probative force which is required to make an item of evidence relevant: “*any tendency to make a [material] fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence*” (emphasis added). *See, e.g., State v. Sparks*, 336 Or. 298, 307, 83 P.3d 304, 310 (2004); *State v. Richardson*, 210 Wis. 2d 694, 707, 563 N.W.2d 899, 904 (1997). In other words, it asks only whether consideration of the item might affect a reasonable juror’s estimate of the probabilities that any material factual proposition is or is not true. In answering this question for the purpose of ruling on an objection that a particular item of evidence is irrelevant, the judge is not supposed to consider the *credibility* (that is, the believability) of the item. The subject of credibility is said to be exclusively for the jury. As a practical matter, this means that any item of “direct evidence” (that is, any statement by a witness that s/he did or observed something that constitutes a material fact) is *per se* relevant. In regard to items of “indirect” or “circumstantial” evidence, the judge must accept the credibility of the item and inquire only whether there is some logically reasonable chain of inference or characterization that connects it with a material factual proposition. The chain needs not be air-tight or conclusive. “[I]t is universally recognized that evidence, to be relevant to an inquiry, need not conclusively prove the ultimate fact in issue, but only have “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”” *New Jersey v. T.L.O.*, 469 U.S. 325, 345 (1985), quoting Fed. Rule Evid. 401.” *McKoy v. North Carolina*, 494 U.S. 433, 439 (1990). *See also United States v. Ray*, 956 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 2020) (reversing a conviction because the trial judge applied an erroneous standard in excluding medical expert testimony proffered by the defendant in support of an insanity defense: applying Federal Evidence Rule 702, the court holds that the “correct legal standard is for the district court ‘to determine the relevance of the psychological evaluation the expert conducted and the medical diagnoses he made, not his ultimate legal conclusion regarding the defendant’s mental state.’”).

The requirement of relevancy is not applied with mechanistic rigor to every isolated factual detail. Details which in themselves lack a strictly logical connection to any material factual proposition are nonetheless ordinarily held to be relevant as “background” or “context” if they set the scene for some other relevant fact – if they situate a relevant fact in its chronological or causal or narrative setting, make it more intelligible, give it the texture and color and drama of life – provided that they do not run on too long or stray too far afield, and that they do not pose a danger of laying affirmatively improper matter before the jury. *See Old Chief v. United States*, 519 U.S. 172, 186-90 (1997).

36.2.2. Arguments for Applying the Relevance Rule in a Manner that Respects the Special Position and Needs of the Defense in a Criminal Trial

In criminal trials, the accused is often given the benefit of the doubt on close questions whether to admit or to exclude evidence. That is particularly true with regard to the admissibility

of evidence proffered by the defense. *See, e.g., Wilson v. State*, 971 So. 2d 963, 965 (Fla. App. 2008). Counsel should urge the judge that it would not be fair if the defendant were deprived of the chance to tell his or her story because of a close call on the question of relevance. Counsel can also point out that the judge's exercise of his or her discretion in favor of admissibility would avoid a possible conflict between state evidentiary rules and the federal constitutional right to present defensive evidence (see § 39.1 *infra*). This Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right has been held to invalidate overly rigid state-law bars to the presentation of an accused's version of the facts. *Chambers v. Mississippi*, 410 U.S. 284 (1973); *Green v. Georgia*, 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (per curiam); *Crane v. Kentucky*, 476 U.S. 683 (1986); *Rock v. Arkansas*, 483 U.S. 44 (1987); *Lunbery v. Hornbeak*, 605 F.3d 754, 760-62 (9th Cir. 2010); *Cudjo v. Ayers*, 698 F.3d 752, 754-55, 762-68 (9th Cir. 2012).

36.2.3. Probative Weight Versus Prejudice

The trial judge has broad discretion to balance the probative weight of proffered evidence against its possible prejudicial impact. If evidence is very prejudicial, the judge may exclude it although it is probative and otherwise admissible within technical evidentiary rules. *See, e.g., Hamling v. United States*, 418 U.S. 87, 127 (1974); *United States v. Abel*, 469 U.S. 45, 54 (1984); *Old Chief v. United States*, 519 U.S. 172, 180-85 (1997); *Crane v. Kentucky*, *supra*, 476 U.S. at 689-90 (dictum). Defense counsel should be quick to invoke this discretion against potentially misleading, inflammatory, or emotion-rousing prosecution evidence. *See, e.g., United States v. Hale*, 422 U.S. 171, 173, 180 (1975); *Old Chief v. United States*, *supra*; *United States v. Nolan*, 956 F.3d 71, 83 (2d Cir. 2020); *United States v. Morgan*, 786 F.3d 227, 232-33 (2d Cir. 2015); *United States v. Vallejo*, 237 F.3d 1008, 1017, as amended by 246 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Agent Ajioka’s testimony concerning the structure and modus operandi of drug trafficking organizations was not relevant to the Government’s case against Vallejo. Nor was it needed to assist the jury’s understanding of a complex criminal case. Agent Ajioka testified to the different roles played by various members of drug trafficking organizations, and although he did not cast Vallejo in a particular role, the implication of his testimony was that Vallejo had knowledge of how the entire organization operated, and thus knew he was carrying the drugs. To admit this testimony on the issue of knowledge, the only issue in the case, was unfairly prejudicial, and an abuse of discretion under Rule 403.”); *State v. Acker*, 871 N.W.2d 603 (N.D. 2015) (reversing an aggravated-assault conviction because the trial judge failed to conduct a proper analysis of the probative/prejudice balance before allowing the prosecution to impeach the defendant with his prior conviction of a sex offense); *State v. Brumbach*, 273 Or. App. 552, 359 P.3d 490 (2015) (reversing a sexual abuse conviction because the trial judge failed to perform a probative/prejudice-balance analysis before allowing the prosecution to present evidence of the defendant’s commission of similar sexual offenses against the same child and other children); *cf. Jenkins v. Anderson*, 447 U.S. 231, 240-41 (1980).

The prosecution’s ability to invoke the probative/prejudice balance as a ground for excluding defense evidence is limited by the defendant’s federal constitutional rights to confrontation (*see Blackston v. Rapelje*, 780 F.3d 340 (6th Cir. 2015), summarized in § 36.3.3 seventh paragraph *infra*) and to present a defense (*see Olden v. Kentucky*, 488 U.S. 227 (1988), summarized in § 39.1 *infra*). “[I]t is clearly established that a trial court violates the Confrontation Clause when it routinely applies Rule 403 balancing to limit cross-examination by

the accused on issues central to the defense.” *Rhodes v. Dittmann*, 903 F.3d 646, 657 (7th Cir. 2018).

36.3. Hearsay and Confrontation

36.3.1. Introduction: The Relationship Between Hearsay and Confrontation Clause Issues

Hearsay is traditionally defined as evidence of “a statement made out of court, the statement being offered as an assertion to show the truth of matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court asserter” (*Lee v. Illinois*, 476 U.S. 530, 543 n.4 (1986), quoting MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 246, p. 584 (2d ed. [Cleary] 1972)). The rules of evidence or appellate precedents in every State exclude hearsay generally but provide numerous, varying, and often complex exceptions to the ban.

In addition to these common-law hearsay rules, the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, which is applicable to state trials through its incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment (*see Pointer v. Texas*, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); *Douglas v. Alabama*, 380 U.S. 415 (1965)), bans prosecutorial proof of certain out-of-court statements in criminal trials. *See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington*, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); *Davis v. Washington*, 547 U.S. 813 (2006); *Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts*, 557 U.S. 305, 324, 329 (2009).

The restrictions established by the constitutional right are not necessarily coincident with the hearsay doctrine of any particular jurisdiction. *See Crawford v. Washington, supra*, 541 U.S. at 50-51. Evidence admissible within a hearsay exception or loophole may violate the right to confrontation. *Id.* at 51. Conversely, an out-of-court statement that is “a good candidate for exclusion under [a jurisdiction’s] hearsay rules” will not invariably be subject to exclusion on federal Confrontation Clause grounds (*id.*).

When objecting to an attempt by a prosecutor to introduce an out-of-court statement, counsel should always clearly state whether the objection is based on the hearsay rule or the Confrontation Clause or both. In the event of a conviction, the failure to specify the grounds for the objection could result in a ruling on appeal that counsel failed to preserve the claim s/he intended to make. *See, e.g., People v. Goldstein*, 6 N.Y.3d 119, 126, 843 N.E.2d 727, 731-32, 810 N.Y.S.2d 100, 104-05 (2005) (declining to reach a hearsay issue because the defense only raised a Confrontation Clause challenge); *People v. Lopez*, 25 A.D.3d 385, 386, 808 N.Y.S.2d 648, 649 (N.Y. App. Div., 1st Dep’t 2006) (defense counsel’s objection on hearsay grounds was insufficient to preserve a Confrontation Clause claim).

It is particularly important, whenever possible, to base an objection on the Confrontation Clause (in conjunction with a hearsay objection, where applicable). Counsel can thereby preserve a federal claim for postconviction review by the federal courts if it is rejected by the state courts. *See* §§ 49.2.2, 49.2.3.2 *infra*. Also, by invoking the Sixth Amendment Confrontation-Clause right, counsel can justify objections to many items of prosecution evidence that have traditionally been admissible under settled local hearsay doctrines. Because the federal caselaw was radically transformed in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 2004 *Crawford* decision, *supra*, and will not

shake down in detail for decades (*see, e.g.*, the exegetic struggles reflected in *Taylor v. State*, 226 Md. App. 317, 130 A.3d 509 (2016)) – and because most state trial judges will be relatively unfamiliar with the voluminous, convoluted body of post-*Crawford* appellate caselaw – a judge who is not eager to undertake legal research or to risk reversible error may be inclined to give the defense the benefit of the doubt when ruling on Sixth Amendment objections. And, finally, unlike hearsay objections, Confrontation Clause objections invoke a source of law – the constitutional guarantee to criminal defendants of a right to confront their accusers – which applies only to the prosecution’s evidence, so they are less likely than hearsay objections to backfire and obstruct the presentation of the defense case.

When raising a Confrontation Clause claim, counsel should explicitly cite the state constitution in addition to the federal Sixth Amendment, so as to preserve a claim that the state constitutional confrontation right is broader than the federal. *Cf. People v. Clay*, 88 A.D.2d 14, 26-27, 926 N.Y.S.2d 598, 608-09 (N.Y. App. Div., 2d Dep’t 2011) (rejecting a Confrontation Clause claim on federal constitutional grounds and then declining to consider whether a different result should be reached under the state constitution because “appellant does not argue that the State Constitution is more protective of the right of confrontation than the Federal Constitution”); *State v. Moore*, 334 Or. 328, 49 P.3d 785 (2002) (invoking the Oregon constitution and rejecting the U.S. Supreme Court’s pre-*Crawford* Sixth Amendment caselaw in requiring a declarant’s unavailability as a condition of admission of excited-utterance testimony); *State v. McGriff*, 76 Hawai’i 148, 156, 871 P.2d 782, 790 (1994) (under the Hawai’i Constitution “we have parted ways with the United States Supreme Court which has held [in its pre-*Crawford* decisions] that the sixth amendment confrontation clause does not necessitate a showing of unavailability for evidence falling within certain hearsay exceptions”).

36.3.2. Hearsay

The hearsay rule says, generally, that a witness is not permitted to recount a statement made by anyone other than the witness – or, in a stricter version, a statement made by anybody, including the witness (except a statement that the witness has made earlier “while testifying at the current trial or hearing” (*see* FED. RULE EVID. 801(c)(1)) – for the purpose of proving “the truth of the matter asserted in the statement” (FED. RULE EVID. 801(c)(2)). “Statements” include oral and written utterances and communicative gestures. *See id.*, RULE 801(a). The aim of the hearsay rule is to forbid the testimonial use of statements that are not made under oath, under the trier’s scrutiny and subject to cross examination. For this purpose, “testimonial use” means any use which depends upon crediting the assertions of the “declarant” (*i.e.*, “the person who made the statement” (*id.*, RULE 801(b))) as though the declarant were a witness, so that their capacity to prove a relevant fact stands or falls on the declarant’s believability. Statements offered *for any other purpose than to prove the truth of the matter stated* are not hearsay.

The hearsay rule is riddled with exceptions. Most of these are tailored to situations in which either (1) the circumstances under which some type of out-of-court statement is made are regarded as furnishing sufficient assurance of reliability so that the risks involved in admitting evidence without the ordinary safeguards of in-court presentation under oath and subject to plenary cross-examination are not exorbitant; or (2) other safeguards are thought to be available as substitutes for the ordinary ones; or (3) exclusion of the particular type of out-of-court

statement would deprive the judicial process of a species of needed information for which there is no adequate substitute, and this consideration is thought to outweigh the risks of unreliability; or (4) there are thought to exist *some* assurances of reliability or *some* safeguards against undetectable unreliability (although these are not as effective as in categories (1) and (2) above), and there is *some* substantial need for the information which a particular type of out-of-court statement is uniquely able to supply (although the need is not as great as in category (3) above), so that, on balance of these considerations, exclusion would be inappropriate. The various hearsay exceptions developed by the common law for these reasons have been codified (and in some instances recast) in Federal Rules of Evidence 803 and 804. In many States, a statute or local rule essentially tracks the Federal Rules in defining the hearsay rule and its exceptions.

36.3.2.1. Defense Objection to Prosecution Evidence as Hearsay

The purpose and effect of the hearsay exceptions are to admit statements which *are* hearsay, to be used as such. But a hearsay statement is admissible within one of these exceptions only if and after evidence has been presented that establishes to the judge's satisfaction the existence of *each and every factual circumstance defined by the applicable subdivision of the rule as an element of the exception*. In other words, a foundation must be laid for the admission of the statement by convincing the court to find as a fact that all of the conditions required by the terms of the exception have been met. Thus, if the prosecution is seeking to admit an out-of-court statement pursuant to an exception to the hearsay rule, counsel can insist that the prosecution present evidence which establishes such a foundation, and counsel can insist that the trial judge make a factual finding of the existence of all of the foundational elements. *See, e.g., Tyrrell v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.*, 97 N.Y.2d 650, 652, 762 N.E.2d 921, 922, 737 N.Y.S.2d 43, 44 (2001) (the trial court's introduction of a hearsay statement as a spontaneous declaration and *res gestae* on the ground that "there was 'no evidence to suggest that the statement was anything other than a spontaneous declaration'" had the effect of "improperly shift[ing] the burden of establishing the exception to the hearsay rule"; the trial court should have required the proponent of the hearsay to "show that at the time of the statement the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by an external event sufficient to still her reflective faculties and had no opportunity for deliberation."); *People v. Cummings*, 31 N.Y.3d 204, 207, 212, 99 N.E.3d 877, 879-80, 883, 75 N.Y.S.3d 484 (2018) (the trial court improperly applied the "excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule" to grant the prosecution's request to admit a 911 call recording in which an "unidentified speaker" in "the background can be faintly heard saying, 'Yo, it was Twanek, man! It was Twanek, man!'" "Because there is no evidence from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that the declarant personally observed the incident, admission of the statement heard in the background of the 911 call was error."); *see also id.* at 214-16, 99 N.E.3d at 885-86 (Rivera, J., concurring) (raising the question whether the "excited utterance" exception to the hearsay rule "should be rejected whole cloth" "in light of advances in psychology and neuroscience that demonstrate an individual's inability to accurately recall facts when experiencing trauma, and, in turn, to create falsehoods immediately," and discussing caselaw and legal scholarship that support the "cabin[ing], if not outright abandon[ment], [of] the exception").

If the prosecution seeks to overcome a hearsay objection by asserting that a statement is not being offered "for the truth of the matter asserted" and thus is not "hearsay," counsel may be

able to counter that the court should find that, notwithstanding the prosecutor’s argument, the way in which the prosecution intends to use the statement at trial actually is for the truth. *See, e.g., United States v. Nelson*, 725 F.3d 615, 620 (6th Cir. 2013) (rejecting the government’s argument that the content of a 911 call was “offered not for the truth of the matter asserted, but rather to show why the officers acted as they did”: “[c]ontrary to the Government’s position, the police officers’ testimony about the 911 call . . . was effectively offered to prove the truth of the statements made” and was “thereby inadmissible” under Fed. Rule Evid. 802.); *United States v. Jones*, 930 F.3d 366 (5th Cir. 2019), summarized in § 36.3.3 *infra* (reaching the same result under the Confrontation Clause); *People v. Goldstein, supra*, 6 N.Y.3d at 127-28, 843 N.E.2d at 732-33, 810 N.Y.S.2d at 105-06 (although the prosecution claimed that statements at issue “were not offered to prove the[ir] truth,” the prosecution “obviously wanted and expected the jury to take the statements as true” and therefore the statements should be deemed as actually being “offered for their truth, and . . . [therefore] hearsay”).

If the court finds that the prosecution genuinely is seeking to use the out-of-court statement for a non-truth-showing purpose – or if counsel chooses not to challenge the prosecutor’s claimed intention in this regard – counsel can nonetheless argue against the admission of the statement on the grounds that (1) the facts which the prosecution claims are inferable from the making of the statement without regard to its truth are themselves irrelevant (see § 36.2.1 *supra*) or (2) that the probative value of those facts is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant, including the prejudice that will result if the statement is considered for its truth (see § 36.2.3 *supra*) – something that jurors may well do despite instructions not to.

Of course, these various arguments should be made only if the defense would benefit from excluding the statement. If it would further the defense’s interest to have the statement in evidence, counsel presumably will forgo all such objections, allow the statement to be admitted, and then use it to advance the defense’s overall narrative and/or to undermine the prosecution’s.

For discussion of the hearsay exception for co-conspirators’ statements, see § 36.5.1 *infra*.

36.3.2.2. *Anticipating Prosecution Objections to Defense Evidence as Hearsay*

Whenever defense counsel wishes to present evidence of an out-of-court statement, s/he needs to anticipate a hearsay objection. The proffer of any hard-copy or electronic document or the enunciation of any sentence in the testimony of a defense witness that begins “He said” or “She said” may well draw a knee-jerk hearsay objection from the prosecutor or a knee-jerk exclusionary ruling (even without a prosecutorial objection) by the judge. Counsel must plan to get past this hurdle.

If the evidence comes squarely within the scope of a conventional hearsay exception – such as, for example, the business-records exception (*see, e.g.,* FED. RULE EVID. 803(6)) – counsel’s first and easiest route around the hurdle is to ask the prosecutor to stipulate to its admissibility. Most prosecutors will do so; and, if they do not, counsel can raise the matter at a pretrial conference with some confidence that the judge will be displeased by this wasteful

stonewalling. See § 18.14 *supra*. Before going the stipulation route, however, defense counsel should consider whether s/he would gain some persuasive benefit from going through the motions of laying the foundation for the hearsay exception by the testimony of a witness or witnesses. If, for example, the witness who can be called to establish the elements of the business-records exception comes across as a model of crackerjack efficiency, his or her technical “foundation” testimony may also lend credibility to the contents of the record s/he produces.

If a stipulation is tactically unwise or is unobtainable, counsel must decide whether to attempt to get past the hearsay-objection hurdle by (1) taking the position that the out-of-court statement is not hearsay (because not offered for the truth), or (2) taking the position that the out-of-court statement is admissible within a hearsay exception, or (3) taking both positions. If s/he opts to take both positions, s/he should ordinarily respond to a prosecution objection by arguing position number (1) *first* and then proceeding on to position number (2). (By the time a lawyer has finished making a hearsay-exception argument, it will be obvious to the judge that counsel wants to get some truth-showing benefit from the evidence, and it will then not be easy to persuade the judge that counsel’s not-for-the-truth arguments are genuine.) If position number (1) fails, position number (2) may save the day; and if position number (1) succeeds, position number (2) may broaden counsel’s right to reason from the evidence in closing argument. (Should counsel prevail only on position number (1), the prosecution will be entitled to a jury instruction that the evidence is not to be considered for its truth.)

To prepare to defend position (1), counsel will need to go through an exhaustive analysis of (a) what ultimate facts are material (see § 36.2.1 third paragraph *supra*), and (b) what logical lines of reasoning could allow those facts to be inferred from the making or existence of the out-of-court statement without regard to its truth. Take this example: Counsel’s client, Daniel, is charged with the theft of money which was kept in a jar behind a stack of canned goods on a shelf in the convenience store where Daniel worked the afternoon shift as a counter attendant. The store-owner, who had not had occasion to go to the jar for several days, discovered it missing one morning. Neither the jar nor the money has been recovered. The prosecution’s case relies on the theory that Daniel was the only person other than the store-owner who knew that money was hidden in the store, plus the testimony of another employee, Willem, who worked the night shift. Willem will testify for the prosecution that Daniel had complained to Willem about “working seven days a week for piss-poor pay” and then bragged that he, Daniel, had “taught the cheapskate a lesson.” Counsel’s defense theory is that Willem was the real thief. Counsel wants to call a delivery-truck driver who made periodic evening stops at the store, to testify that, a few days before the theft, Willem told Driver that Daniel had told Willem that “the old man has got a wad of cash stashed somewhere in the store.” Counsel’s response to the prosecution’s hearsay objection is that this conversation is not being offered for the truth but (i) to discredit Willem’s testimony for bias, since Willem can escape suspicion himself by putting Daniel in the frame (*cf. Olden v. Kentucky*, 488 U.S. 227 (1988)); (ii) to show that Willem was as likely as Daniel to have stolen the money, since both had equal means and opportunity (*cf. Holmes v. South Carolina*, 547 U.S. 319 (2006); *United States v. Crosby*, 75 F.3d 1343 (9th Cir. 1996)); and (iii) to defeat the prosecution’s premise that no one other than the store owner and Daniel knew about the cache of money in the store – since Willem had not only evinced such knowledge but shared it with a casual acquaintance and was no less likely to have talked about it to other people as

well. As these contentions suggest, two of the most commonly available routes around a hearsay objection are “state of mind” arguments: – that the mere making of the statement (without considering whether it is true) furnishes circumstantial evidence of the existence of relevant knowledge, motive, intention or bias on the part of either the out-of-court speaker or those to whom s/he spoke.

To prepare to defend position (2) – that an out-of-court statement comes within a hearsay exception – counsel will need to drill a foundation witness to cover systematically all of the factual elements needed to bring the exception into play. To activate the business-records exception, for example, a defense witness will have to testify that: (i) s/he is the custodian of a set of records (ii) kept by a regularly conducted business or other organization, (iii) which maintains such records in the regular course of its activities, and (iv) that the particular record proffered was created and kept pursuant to that regular practice; and (v) was made at or near the time of the event or condition recorded, (vi) by a person with knowledge of the event or condition or from information transmitted by such a person. (Counsel may have to prove some of these elements circumstantially. Where – as is common – the original maker of a record is unavailable or has no recollection of making that particular record, elements (v) and (vi) can be established by having a witness who is familiar with the organization’s general record-making and record-filing procedures testify that records of this kind: (A) are made in the first instance contemporaneously with the occurrences recorded, and (B) only by individuals with personal knowledge or a first-hand report of those occurrences, and (C) are inscribed in a particular, conventional form, and (D) are retained in a particular form and location; and that (E) *this* record was retrieved from the usual location of such records and that (F) it displays the characteristic form of those records.) The need to attend to minutiae in foundation-laying means that, if counsel wants to produce an efficient-looking, non-boring performance, witness rehearsal is crucial. See § 29.5.3 *supra*.

36.3.3. *The Confrontation Clause*

The Supreme Court has emphasized that a primary goal of the Confrontation Clause is not simply to “ensure reliability of [the prosecution’s] evidence” but to “command[] . . . that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination” (*Crawford v. Washington*, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004)). See also *United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez*, 548 U.S. 140, 145-46 (2006) (dictum). Prior to the *Crawford* decision, Confrontation Clause claims were governed by a standard established in *Ohio v. Roberts*, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), which permitted the admission of prosecution evidence that was not subject to cross-examination if the proffered evidence fell within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” or was shown to bear “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” (*Crawford, supra*, 541 U.S. at 60 (quoting *Roberts, supra*, 448 U.S. at 66)). In *Crawford*, the Court rejected this approach, explaining that “reliability” and “trustworthiness” cannot be the benchmarks of compliance with the Confrontation Clause because “we do not think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment’s protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to amorphous notions of ‘reliability’” (541 U.S. at 61). *Crawford*’s new Sixth Amendment touchstone is a purportedly straightforward, bright-line rule barring prosecution evidence of any out-of-court “testimonial statement” unless (1) the declarant is “unavailable to testify” at trial, and (2) the defendant has had an adequate “prior opportunity for cross-examination” of the declarant (*id.* at

54; *see also id.* at 58, 59 & n.9, 68).

Although the Supreme Court has not as yet “spell[ed] out a comprehensive definition of [the term] ‘testimonial’” (*id.* at 68; *see also id.* at 68 n.10 (acknowledging that “our refusal to articulate a comprehensive definition in this case will cause interim uncertainty”)), the Court has made clear that the category of “testimonial statements” is a broad one, encompassing at least the following: testimony in a formal proceeding, such as “at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial” (*id.* at 68); affidavits prepared for litigation (*see id.* at 51-52; *see also, e.g., United States v. Duron-Caldera*, 737 F.3d 988, 993-96 (5th Cir. 2013)); forensic analysis reports (such as, for example, a report in a drug sale or possession case that shows that “material seized by the police and connected to the defendant was [a controlled substance]”), at least where “the analysts’ [written] statements . . . [were] prepared specifically for use at . . . trial” (*Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts*, 557 U.S. 305, 324, 329 (2009)); statements made to the police by a suspect in the course of police interrogation (*Crawford, supra*, 541 U.S. at 52-53, 68-69); and (except in circumstances explained in the second paragraph after this one) statements made to the police by a civilian witness at the scene of a crime, when the police arrive to investigate shortly after the crime was reported (*see Davis v. Washington*, 547 U.S. 813, 829-32 (2006); *Michigan v. Bryant*, 562 U.S. 344, 355-59 (2011) (dictum)). *See also Commonwealth v. Brown*, 646 Pa. 396, 417-18, 185 A.3d 316, 329 (. 2018) (dictum) (“Pennsylvania law requires the preparation of autopsy reports in all cases of sudden, violent, and suspicious deaths, or deaths by other than natural causes, and in such cases, the autopsy and subsequent report are designed to determine whether the death occurred as the result of a criminal act. . . . Moreover, the law requires the coroner or medical examiner charged with conducting and reporting the results of such autopsies to consult and advise the local district attorney to the extent practicable. . . . Accordingly, we determine the primary purpose for preparation of an autopsy report under these circumstances is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to a later criminal prosecution and that any person creating the report would reasonably believe it would be available for use at a later criminal trial. Thus, we conclude the autopsy report in this case was testimonial.”); *Lambert v. Warden Greene SCI*, 861 F.3d 459, 470 (3d Cir. 2017) (the prosecution’s use against Lambert of statements which Lambert’s codefendant made to his defense psychiatrist prior to trial and which the psychiatrist recounted at trial in the codefendant’s defense case, were “testimonial” for Confrontation Clause purposes even though the statements “were not made with the primary purpose of creating evidence for the prosecution” and were not “made with the intent to accuse”; “in the context of the joint trial, Lambert needs only to show that . . . [the codefendant’s] statements to [the psychiatrist] . . . were made with the primary purpose of substituting for his in-court testimony about the crime”); *State v. Swaney*, 787 N.W.2d 541, 554 (Minn. 2010) (the Confrontation Clause applies not only to out-of-court statements of the nontestifying declarant but also to any “testimony that inescapably implies a nontestifying witness’s testimonial hearsay statement”); *People v. Jones*, 166 A.D.3d 803, 88 N.Y.S.3d 88 (N.Y. App. Div., 2d Dep’t 2018) (prosecution witnesses qualified as experts in gang behavior were permitted to testify to conclusions based on their experience in debriefing scores of gang members who had been arrested and were in custody: “[C]ontrary to the People’s contention, information derived from the debriefing of arrested S.N.O.W. Gang members constitutes testimonial statements within the meaning of *Crawford*. . . . The more difficult question presented is whether the substance of such statements was impermissibly conveyed to the jury by . . . [the experts] in the guise of expert testimony. We find that it was. ¶ For instance,

when Georg, over defense counsel's objection, was asked about the basis for his decision to arrest the defendant and others who had congregated in Montbellier Park on April 1, 2014, on a charge of unlawful assembly, Georg specifically mentioned debriefings he had conducted with unnamed members of the S.N.O.W. Gang. While the Supreme Court promptly sustained an objection precluding Georg from conveying to the jury what the unnamed gang members had told him, the fact remains that the jury was made to understand that the basis for Georg's belief that the defendant was 'preparing to engage . . . in tumultuous and violent conduct' . . . was information obtained from Georg's prior questioning of arrested members of the S.N.O.W. Gang. Nor is there any indication that Georg merely relied on this hearsay information for the purpose of forming an independent opinion based on his own expertise."); *United States v. Charles*, 722 F.3d 1319, 1320-21, 1330-31 (11th Cir. 2013) (the Confrontation Clause was violated by the admission of a Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officer's "testimony of the interpreter's statements of what [defendant] Charles said where Charles had no opportunity to cross-examine the interpreter" who "translated Charles's Creole language statements into English during the CBP officer's interrogation of Charles").

The Supreme Court has "repeatedly reserved" the question "whether statements to persons other than law enforcement officers are subject to the Confrontation Clause" (*Ohio v. Clark*, 576 U.S. 237, 246 (2015); *Michigan v. Bryant*, *supra*, 562 U.S. at 357 n.3), although it has observed that "at least some statements to individuals who are not law enforcement officers could conceivably raise confrontation concerns" and it has therefore "decline[d] to adopt a categorical rule excluding them from the Sixth Amendment's reach" (*Ohio v. Clark*, *supra*, 576 U.S. at 246). The *Clark* case says "[n]evertheless, [that] such statements are much less likely to be testimonial than statements to law enforcement officers" (*id.*), and it upholds the admission of out-of-court statements of a three-year-old child to his public-school teachers, identifying the defendant as his sexual abuser, on the ground that "neither the child nor his teachers had the primary purpose of assisting in . . . [a criminal] prosecution" (*id.* at 240). "When . . . [the] teachers noticed . . . [the child's] injuries, they rightly became worried that the 3-year-old was the victim of serious violence. Because the teachers needed to know whether it was safe to release . . . [him] to his guardian at the end of the day, they needed to determine who might be abusing the child." *Id.* at 246.

Thus far, the Court has definitively classified only one type of statement as falling outside the category of "testimonial" statements: "[s]tatements . . . made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency" (*Davis v. Washington*, *supra*, 547 U.S. at 822). *See also id.* ("Statements . . . are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution."); *Michigan v. Bryant*, *supra*, 562 U.S. at 358 ("When, as in *Davis* [*v. Washington*], the primary purpose of an interrogation is to respond to an 'ongoing emergency,' its purpose is not to create a record for trial and thus is not within the scope of the [Confrontation] Clause"). The judicial assessment of the "'primary purpose of the interrogation'" should be made by "objectively evaluating the statements and actions of the parties to the encounter, in light of the circumstances in which the interrogation occurs" (*Michigan v. Bryant*, *supra*, 562 U.S. at 370). "[T]he existence *vel non* of an ongoing emergency" at the time of the

police questioning is not “dispositive of the testimonial inquiry”; “whether an ongoing emergency exists is simply one factor” (*id.* at 366); but it is “among the most important circumstances informing the ‘primary purpose’ of an interrogation” (*id.* at 361) because “statements made to assist police in addressing an ongoing emergency presumably lack the testimonial purpose that would subject them to the requirement of confrontation” (*id.* at 370). “[T]he existence and duration of an emergency depend on the type and scope of danger posed to the victim, the police, and the public.” *Id.* at 370-71. Compare *Davis*, *supra*, 547 U.S. at 827-28 (holding that a portion of a civilian witness’s statements to a 911 operator during the course of a 911 telephone call was nontestimonial because “the circumstances of . . . [the complainant’s] interrogation [by the 911 operator] objectively indicate . . . [that the interrogation’s] primary purpose was to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency,” in that the complainant “was speaking about events *as they were actually happening*, rather than ‘describ[ing] past events’”; “any reasonable listener would recognize that [the complainant] . . . was facing an ongoing emergency”; the complainant’s “call was plainly a call for help against bona fide physical threat”; “the nature of what was asked and answered . . . viewed objectively, was such that the elicited statements were necessary to be able to *resolve* the present emergency, rather than simply to learn . . . what had happened in the past”; and the complainant’s “frantic answers were provided over the phone, in an environment that was not tranquil, or even (as far as any reasonable 911 operator could make out) safe.”), *with id.* at 829-30 (holding, in the companion case of *Hammon v. Indiana*, that an in-person statement to the police by the complainant in a domestic disturbance at her home was “testimonial” because “[t]here was no emergency in progress”; the officer “was not seeking to determine (as in [the companion case,] *Davis*) ‘what is happening,’ but rather ‘what happened’”; and the statement “recounted, in response to police questioning, how potentially criminal past events began and progressed.”), and *with Michigan v. Bryant*, *supra*, 562 U.S. at 371-78 (a mortally wounded shooting victim’s statement to the police, in which the victim identified the shooter and described the location of the shooting, was not “testimonial” because “the circumstances of the encounter [between the victim and the police] as well as the statements and actions of [the victim] and the police objectively indicate that the ‘primary purpose of the interrogation’” was “to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency””: “there was an ongoing emergency here where an armed shooter, whose motive for and location after the shooting were unknown, had mortally wounded [the victim] within a few blocks and a few minutes of the location where the police found [the victim]”; the victim’s “encounter with the police and all of the statements he made during that interaction occurred within the first few minutes of the police officers’ arrival and well before they secured the scene of the shooting – the shooter’s last known location”; the victim was “lying in a gas station parking lot bleeding from a mortal gunshot wound to his abdomen” and “[h]is answers to the police officers’ questions were punctuated with questions about when emergency medical services would arrive,” and thus it cannot be said that “a person in [his] situation would have had a ‘primary purpose’ ‘to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution’”; the questions asked by the officers were “the exact type of questions necessary to . . . solicit [] the information necessary to enable them ‘to meet an ongoing emergency’”; and “[n]othing in [the victim’s] responses indicated to the police that, contrary to their expectation upon responding to a call reporting a shooting, there was no emergency or that a prior emergency had ended.”), and *with Ohio v. Clark*, *supra*, 135 S. Ct. at 2181-82 (where, as summarized in the preceding paragraph, “the immediate concern was to protect a vulnerable child who needed help. . . . As in [*Michigan v.*] *Bryant*, the emergency in this case was ongoing, and the

circumstances were not entirely clear. . . . [The child]’s teachers were not sure who had abused him or how best to secure his safety. Nor were they sure whether any other children might be at risk. As a result, their questions and . . . [the child]’s answers were primarily aimed at identifying and ending the threat. . . [by] identify[ing] the abuser in order to protect the victim from future attacks. . . . There is no indication that the primary purpose of the conversation was to gather evidence for . . . [the defendant’s] prosecution. On the contrary, it is clear that the first objective was to protect . . . [the child].”). *See, e.g., McCarley v. Kelly*, 801 F.3d 652, 664-65 (6th Cir. 2015) (out-of-court statements by the murder victim’s three-year-old son to a child psychologist, which were made during clinical interviews, were “testimonial” because “they were deliberately elicited in an interrogation-like atmosphere absent an ongoing emergency and used to prove past events in a later criminal prosecution”: “Because Dr. Lord was questioning D.P. about the night of his mother’s murder and reporting everything D.P. said that might be relevant to the investigation back to Lt. Karabatsos, Dr. Lord was acting more as a police interrogator than a child psychologist engaged in private counseling.”; “D.P.’s statements to Dr. Lord occurred long after – ten days, to be precise – any emergency situation had passed.”; “The lieutenant unambiguously stated that his ‘main concern’ and the ‘main reason’ for D.P.’s sessions with Dr. Lord ‘was to try to get the information’ that police personnel could not elicit from D.P. – including the identity of the suspects – so that Lt. Karabatsos ‘could use it in [his] investigation.’”); *State in the Interest of J.A.*, 195 N.J. 324, 329, 347, 348, 949 A.2d 790, 792, 803, 804 (2008) (statements by a witness to a police officer, “describing a robbery committed ten minutes earlier and his pursuit of the robbers,” were “testimonial” and admitted in violation of the Confrontation Clause because “a declarant’s narrative to a law enforcement officer about a crime, which once completed has ended any ‘imminent danger’ to the declarant or some other identifiable person, is testimonial”). “In addition to the circumstances in which an encounter occurs, the statements and actions of both the declarant and interrogators provide objective evidence of the primary purpose of the interrogation. . . . Th[is] combined approach [of “account[ing] for both the declarant and the interrogator”] . . . ameliorates problems that could arise from looking solely to one participant. Predominant among these is the problem of mixed motives on the part of both interrogators and declarants.” *Michigan v. Bryant, supra*, 562 U.S. at 367-68. *See, e.g., id.* at 375 (neither the police nor the declarant “had a ‘primary purpose’ ‘to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution’”); *Ohio v. Clark, supra*, 135 S. Ct. at 2177. The Supreme Court has cautioned that even when a 911 call or in-person conversation with the police “begins as an interrogation to determine the need for emergency assistance” and is therefore initially nontestimonial, the exchange with the police can “‘evolve into testimonial statements,’ . . . once that purpose [of dealing with the emergency] has been achieved” (*Davis v. Washington, supra*, 547 U.S. at 828). *See also id.* at 828-29 (“[i]t could readily be maintained that” portions of the 911 call that followed the portion the Court classified as nontestimonial should be deemed “testimonial” because they followed the point at which “the emergency appears to have ended” and involved “a battery of questions” by the 911 operator). Thus, the Court has recognized that it may sometimes be necessary for judges to use an “*in limine* procedure . . . to redact or exclude the portions of any statement that have become testimonial, as . . . [judges] do, for example, with unduly prejudicial portions of otherwise admissible evidence” (*id.* at 829). Regarding *in limine* procedures and redaction, see §§ 17.5.3, 34.7.3 *supra*; §§ 40.4.1, 40.5 *infra*.

In *dicta*, the Court has identified some other types of statements that may be non-

testimonial for purposes of *Crawford*:

- “Business and public records . . . created for the administration of an entity’s affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact at trial” may be non-testimonial (*Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts*, 557 U.S. 305, 324 (2009) (dictum)). See also *id.* at 311 n.1; *Crawford, supra*, 541 U.S. at 56. But the Court has made clear that a “business or official record[]” is “testimonial” if it was “prepared specifically for use at . . . trial” – as is the case, for example, when the prosecution seeks to “prove its case via *ex parte* out-of-court affidavits” of forensic analysts (*Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, supra*, 557 U.S. at 324, 329). Accord, *Bullcoming v. New Mexico*, 564 U.S. 647, 652 (2011) (the Confrontation Clause prevents the prosecution from “introduc[ing] a forensic laboratory report containing a testimonial certification – made for the purpose of proving a particular fact – through the in-court testimony of a scientist who did not sign the certification or perform or observe the test reported in the certification”; “[t]he accused’s right is to be confronted with the analyst who made the certification, unless that analyst is unavailable at trial, and the accused had an opportunity, pretrial, to cross-examine that particular scientist.”); *Martin v. State*, 60 A.3d 1100, 1102-09 (Del. 2013); *State v. Navarette*, 294 P.3d 435, 436 (N.M. 2013). Compare *Williams v. Illinois*, 567 U.S. 50 (2012) (affirming a lower court’s rejection of a Confrontation Clause challenge to the admission of a testifying expert witness’s reference to information in a forensic report prepared by a different, non-testifying expert, but announcing this ruling without attaining a majority on the rationale: a plurality opinion, authored by Justice Alito and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy and Breyer, concluded that there was no Confrontation Clause violation because the “report itself was neither admitted into evidence nor shown to the [judicial] factfinder” in the bench trial (*id.* at 62); the testifying expert “did not quote or read from the report” or “identify it as the source of any of the opinions she expressed” (*id.*); and the judicial fact-finder could be relied upon to understand that the statement could not be “consider[ed] . . . for its truth” (*id.* at 79); a dissenting opinion by Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg and Sotomayor, concluded that the challenged statement “went to its truth” and therefore was inadmissible (*see id.* at 126); Justice Thomas, who concurred in the plurality’s judgment, thereby providing a fifth vote for affirming the lower court’s ruling, stated that he “share[d] the dissent’s view” that the “statements were introduced for their truth” (*id.* at 103, 109); he apparently agreed, also, that testimonial statements introduced for their truth are constitutionally barred at a bench trial (*id.* at 106 n.1), but he nonetheless joined the plurality in affirming the conviction because of his view that unsworn forensic reports like the one at issue in *Williams* “lack[] the requisite ‘formality and solemnity’ to be considered “‘testimonial’” for purposes of the Confrontation Clause.” (*id.* at 103)), with *United States v. James*, 712 F.3d 79, 94-96, 99, 102 (2d Cir. 2013) (concluding that “[n]o single rationale disposing of the *Williams* case enjoys the support of a majority of the Justices” and therefore it is necessary to view *Williams* as “confined to the particular set of facts presented in that case” and to continue to “rely on Supreme Court precedent before *Williams*”; the court of appeals applies the pre-*Williams* rule to hold that autopsy and toxicology reports that were challenged on Confrontation Clause grounds were not “testimonial” because they were “not prepared primarily to create a record for use at a criminal trial.”), and *Jenkins v. United States*, 75 A.3d 174 (D.C. 2013) (agreeing with

the Second Circuit that “the splintered decision in *Williams*, which failed to produce a common view shared by at least five Justices, creates no new rule of law that we can apply in this case” (*id.* at 176) and that it is therefore necessary to continue to follow “pre-*Williams* precedent in the Supreme Court and in our own jurisdiction” (*id.* at 189); the D.C. Court of Appeals applies its pre-*Williams* precedent to hold that the trial court violated the Confrontation Clause by “permitt[ing] the government to present the entirety of its DNA evidence through the testimony of a single expert witness (*id.* at 176) – a “forensic examiner” in the “FBI DNA Analysis Unit” who “does not perform the tests on the biological material himself but, rather, is ‘assisted by [b]iologists or technicians who actually perform the hands-on part of the testing’ or ‘DNA typing’ in the laboratory” (*id.* at 190) – “without making available for cross-examination the laboratory analysts who performed the underlying serological and DNA laboratory work” (*id.* at 176), where the “serology and DNA testing was conducted for the primary purpose of establishing some fact relevant to a later criminal prosecution.” (*id.* at 191)). *See also United States v. Duron-Caldera*, *supra*, 737 F.3d at 994 n.4 (“In *Williams*, there is no common denominator between the plurality opinion and Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion. Neither of these opinions can be viewed as a logical subset of the other. . . . As *Williams* does not yield a ‘narrowest’ holding that enjoys the support of five Justices, it does not provide a controlling rule useful to resolving this case.”); Edward K. Cheng & Cara C. Mannion, *Unraveling Williams v. Illinois*, ___ N.Y.U. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2020) [*available at* <https://ssrn-id3540755>]; and *see Commonwealth v. Tassone*, 468 Mass. 391, 392, 399-402, 11 N.E.3d 67, 68, 72-75 (2014) (applying the State’s “common law of evidence” to hold that “an opinion regarding the results of DNA testing is admissible only where the defendant has a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine the expert witness about the reliability of the underlying data produced by such testing,” and that “[h]ere, the defendant was deprived of a meaningful opportunity for such cross-examination because the analysts who generated the DNA profiles through DNA testing did not testify at trial, and the expert witness who offered the opinion of a match had no affiliation with the laboratory that tested the crime scene sample.”). *And see generally* Lauren McLane, *Confronting the Twenty-First-Century Marian Examination*, 82 ALBANY L. REV. 949 (2018-2019).

- “[A] clerk’s certificate authenticating an official record – or a copy thereof – for use as evidence” may be non-testimonial, but “a clerk’s certificate attesting to the fact that the clerk had searched for a particular relevant record and failed to find it . . . [in a case in which the defendant’s] guilt depend[s] on the nonexistence of the record for which the clerk searched” is testimonial (*Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts*, *supra*, 557 U.S. at 322-23). *See also United States v. Martinez-Rios*, 595 F.3d 581, 585-86 (5th Cir. 2010); *State v. Kennedy*, 846 N.W.2d 517, 525-27 (Iowa 2014); *People v. Pacer*, 6 N.Y.3d 504, 847 N.E.2d 1149, 814 N.Y.S.2d 575 (2006); *State v. Jasper*, 174 Wash. 2d 96, 100, 114-16, 271 P.3d 876, 879, 886-87 (2012).
- Statements by a co-conspirator made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy may be non-testimonial. *See Crawford*, *supra*, 541 U.S. at 56; *see also id.* at 58 (discussing *Bourjaily v. United States*, 483 U.S. 171 (1987)). *See also* § 36.5.1 *infra*.

- Some “dying declarations” may be non-testimonial. Compare *Crawford, supra*, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6 (“many dying declarations may not be testimonial”), with *Michigan v. Bryant, supra*, 562 U.S. at 395-96 (Justice Ginsburg, dissenting) (“Were the issue properly tendered here, I would take up the question whether the exception for dying declarations survives our recent Confrontation Clause decisions.”). But see, e.g., *United States v. Mayhew*, 380 F. Supp. 2d 961, 965 & n.5 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (rejecting the prosecution’s argument that “dying declarations are an exception to the Confrontation Clause”).

Like the hearsay rule, “[t]he Confrontation Clause prohibits an out-of-court statement only if it is admitted for its truth” (*Woods v. Etherton*, 136 S. Ct. 1149, 1152 (2016)). In cases in which the prosecution seeks to evade the protections of the Clause by asserting that a statement is not being offered “for the truth of the matter asserted,” the defense often will be able to challenge the validity of that claim. See, e.g., *People v. Hopson*, 3 Cal. 5th 424, 425-26, 433-34, 396 P.3d 1054, 1056, 1061, 219 Cal. Rptr. 3d 717, 719, 725 (2017) (the prosecutor’s introduction into evidence of an out-of-court statement, purportedly for a non-truth purpose, violated the Confrontation Clause because “the jury was never informed of the limited nonhearsay purpose for which . . . [the out-of-court statement] was ostensibly admitted, and, critically, the prosecution did not use . . . [the out-of-court statement] for any such limited purpose” and instead used it “for its truth”); *People v. Goldstein*, 6 N.Y.3d 119, 127-28, 843 N.E.2d 727, 732-33, 810 N.Y.S.2d 100, 105-06 (2005) (rejecting the prosecution’s argument that the Confrontation Clause did not apply to a prosecution psychiatrist’s testimony about hearsay statements underlying her diagnosis which “were not offered to establish their truth” and were offered merely to “help the jury in evaluating . . . [the psychiatrist’s] opinion”: “Since the prosecution’s goal was to buttress . . . [the psychiatrist’s] opinion, the prosecution obviously wanted and expected the jury to take the statements as true,” and therefore the statements must be deemed to have been offered for the truth.). See also *Lambert v. Warden Greene SCI*, 861 F.3d 459, 470 (3d Cir. 2017) (“Because the[] [challenged out-of-court] statements were testimonial, we next determine if the prosecution used them for the truth asserted therein In making this determination, we are not to accept the prosecution’s ‘not-for-truth’ rationale at face value, but instead must determine if there is a “‘legitimate, non hearsay purpose,’” *Williams [v. Illinois]*, 132 S. Ct. at 2257 (Thomas, J., concurring) . . . (emphasis in text), by ‘thoroughly examin[ing] the use of the out-of-court [statements] and the efficacy of a limiting instruction.’”); *United States v. Jones*, 930 F.3d 366, 376-77 (5th Cir. 2019) (finding a Confrontation Clause violation where the prosecutor asked the arresting agent “How did you know that a drug deal had, in fact, occurred?” and the agent responded “So once . . . the other units saw what looked like a drug deal, I made a phone call to my confidential source, who then made some phone calls himself and got back to me that the deal had happened”: the court rejects the Government’s argument “that the informant’s statements were not introduced for their truth, but simply to explain the actions of law enforcement officers” and it finds the Sixth Amendment error reversible even though “the district court instructed the jury that testimony regarding the confidential informant ‘was admitted only to explain why law enforcement was conducting various surveillance operations,’ and could not be used ‘as evidence the defendant, or anyone else, actually engaged in a drug transaction.’”); *Orlando v. Nassau Cty. Dist. Attorney's Office*, 915 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2019), summarized in § 36.5.2 *infra*; *United States v. Nelson*, 725 F.3d 615, 620 (6th Cir. 2013) (rejecting the government’s argument, in the context of a non-constitutional hearsay issue, that the content of a 911 call was “offered not for the truth of the

matter asserted, but rather to show why the officers acted as they did”: “[c]ontrary to the Government’s position, the police officers’ testimony about the 911 call . . . was effectively offered to prove the truth of the statements made” and was “thereby inadmissible” under FED. RULE EVID. 802.). Even if the judge accepts the prosecution’s characterization of the statement as not being offered for the “truth of the matter asserted,” defense counsel may be able to lodge a follow-up objection to the proffered evidence on the ground that the non-truth purpose for which the prosecution is seeking to admit the evidence is irrelevant or that the probative value of the evidence for that purpose is substantially outweighed by the prejudicial risk that the trier will impermissibly credit the evidence for its truth (see §§ 36.2.1, 36.2.3, 36.3.2.1 third paragraph *supra*).

If the statement the prosecution seeks to admit is a “testimonial” statement by an unavailable witness that is offered “for the truth of the matter,” then *Crawford* requires its exclusion unless the defense has had an adequate “prior opportunity for cross-examination” (*Crawford, supra*, 541 U.S. at 68). In cases in which there was a preliminary hearing and defense counsel cross-examined the now-unavailable prosecution witness at that hearing, the prosecutor may claim that the defense has had the requisite prior opportunity for cross-examination of the witness. But *Crawford* presupposes an adequate opportunity to “test” the reliability of a witness’s account in the “crucible of cross-examination” (*see id.* at 61), and usually preliminary hearings are too limited in scope and depth to substitute for a full-blown, wide-ranging cross-examination at trial. *See, e.g., People v. Fry*, 92 P.3d 970, 972 (Colo. 2004); *State v. Nofoa*, 135 Hawai’i 220, 230-34, 349 P.3d 327, 337-41 (2015); *People v. Torres*, 2012 IL 111302, 962 N.E.2d 919, 932-34, 357 Ill. Dec. 18, 31-33 (2012); *State v. Stuart*, 279 Wis. 2d 659, 672-76, 695 N.W.2d 259, 265-67 (2005). *Cf. Lee v. Illinois, supra*, 476 U.S. at 546 n.6 (the State’s argument that the accused “was afforded an opportunity to cross-examine [the author of the out-of-court statement] . . . during the suppression hearing” and that this opportunity satisfied the Confrontation Clause is rejected by the Court because the limited nature of the inquiry at a suppression hearing precluded an “opportunity for cross-examination sufficient to satisfy the demands of the Confrontation Clause”); *and see Corona v. State*, 64 So. 3d 1232, 1241 (Fla. 2011) (discovery depositions, available to the defense in criminal cases under state rules, “do not meet *Crawford*’s cross-examination requirement” of “afford[ing] [the accused] an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the . . . declarant” because, *inter alia*, such depositions are “not designed as an opportunity to engage in adversarial testing of the evidence against the defendant,” and they are admissible at trial solely “for purposes of impeachment” and not as “substantive evidence”); *Blackston v. Rapelje*, 780 F.3d 340 (6th Cir. 2015) (the defendant’s first conviction was vacated and he was retried. “Before the second trial was held, two of the state’s key witnesses recanted their testimony. Because those witnesses were later determined to be unavailable at the new trial, the court ordered their earlier testimony read to the jury, while at the same time denying Blackston the right to impeach their testimony with evidence of their subsequent recantations.” *Id.* at 344. “The Michigan Supreme Court found, and the state argues, that Simpson and Zantello were confronted adequately at the first trial and that further impeachment based on the recantations would be ‘largely cumulative.’ . . . ¶ We conclude that the difference between the recantations and the impeachment at the first trial was one of kind, not degree, and that the state court was objectively unreasonable in concluding otherwise.” *Id.* at 354-55. “Finally, whether or not the state courts were justified in some ‘skeptici[sm]’ of Zantello’s and Simpson’s reliability, it was plainly a misapplication of Rule 403 [the applicable

probative/prejudice balance rule (see § 36.2.3 *supra*)] to prevent the jury from hearing the recantations on that basis. The Confrontation Clause . . . applies regardless of whether the judge is swayed personally by the material’s substantive persuasiveness. Nor are mere reliability concerns under Rule 403 the sort of ‘paramount’ state interests that would allow the exclusion of evidence, let alone trump a defendant’s confrontation rights.” *Id.* at 357.).

In announcing a new standard for Confrontation Clause analysis of “testimonial” statements in *Crawford v. Washington*, the Supreme Court did not provide any guidance to the lower courts on how to apply the Confrontation Clause to statements that are classified as “non-testimonial.” In the wake of *Crawford*, some lower courts concluded that the Confrontation Clause applies to non-testimonial as well as testimonial statements, and that the proper approach to assessing a Confrontation Clause challenge to admission of a non-testimonial statement is the pre-*Crawford* standard of *Ohio v. Roberts*, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). *See, e.g., Summers v. Dretke*, 431 F.3d 861, 877 (5th Cir. 2005); *United States v. Hinton*, 423 F.3d 355, 358 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005); *Horton v. Allen*, 370 F.3d 75, 84 (1st Cir. 2004); *State v. Rivera*, 268 Conn. 351, 362-63, 844 A.2d 191, 200-01 (2004). But in *Davis v. Washington*, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), a post-*Crawford* decision, the Supreme Court later indicated that non-testimonial statements do not implicate the Confrontation Clause. *Davis* is a singularly unsatisfactory opinion because (1) it treats *Crawford* as having implicitly resolved that non-testimonial “hearsay . . . is not subject to the Confrontation Clause” (*Davis v. Washington, supra*, 547 U.S. at 821, 823-24), whereas a close reading of the *Crawford* opinion readily reveals that *Crawford* nowhere addressed this issue, saying only that “[w]here nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers’ design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law – as does *Roberts*, and as would an approach that exempted such statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether” (541 U.S. at 68); and (2) the *Davis* Court’s only other statement on the subject – a comment that “[a] limitation [of the Confrontation Clause to “testimonial” statements] so clearly reflected in the text of the constitutional provision must fairly be said to mark out not merely its ‘core,’ but its perimeter” (*Davis, supra*, 547 U.S. at 824) – is palpably oblique. (Compare *Crawford, supra*, 541 U.S. at 59 (rejecting a litigant’s characterization of a prior decision by stating that the Court would not “authoritatively . . . announce” a significant doctrinal modification “in such an oblique manner”).) *Davis* is therefore a prime candidate for rejection by state courts interpreting their state constitutional confrontation guarantees. See § 17.11 *supra*.

The Supreme Court has stated in *dictum* that an accused may “forfeit” the protections of the Confrontation Clause with respect to a witness’s out-of-court statement by “obtain[ing] . . . the absence of . . . [the] witness by wrongdoing” (*Davis v. Washington, supra*, 547 U.S. at 833). In making this statement, the Court explained that it was “tak[ing] no position on the standards necessary to demonstrate such forfeiture” (*id.*). In *Giles v. California*, 554 U.S. 353 (2008), the Court definitively rejected a “theory of forfeiture by wrongdoing accepted by the California Supreme Court,” explaining that the lower court’s formulation diverged from “founding-era” and subsequent judicial conceptions of the “confrontation right” by failing to require a showing that the defendant not only caused the maker of the out-of-court statement “to be absent” but “engag[ed] in conduct *designed* to prevent the witness from testifying” and with the express “intent[ion] to prevent [the] . . . witness from testifying” (*id.* at 358-59, 368). *See also, e.g., People v. Burns*, 494 Mich. 104, 115-17, 832 N.W.2d 738, 745-46 (2013) (evidence that the defendant “instructed” his infant daughter “‘not to tell’ anyone [about the alleged abuse]

and warned her that if she told, she would ‘get in trouble’” did not justify a finding of forfeiture of the Confrontation Clause by wrongdoing because the “defendant’s contemporaneous statements to CB are as consistent with the inference that defendant’s intention was that the alleged abuse go undiscovered as they are with an inference that defendant specifically intended to prevent CB from testifying”). Many jurisdictions have established standards for determining whether an accused’s actions in procuring the absence of a prosecution witness should be deemed to forfeit the protections of the jurisdiction’s hearsay rule, but often these standards address only the hearsay rule and do not address the distinct question of what standards and procedures govern a claim of forfeiture under the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause. *See, e.g., United States v. Scott*, 284 F.3d 758, 762 (7th Cir. 2002).

A few lower courts have permitted the introduction of an out-of-court statement, notwithstanding a Confrontation Clause violation, if “the defendant opened the door to the admission of limited testimonial statements as necessary to clarify, rebut, or complete a particular issue, such as questions concerning the adequacy of a police investigation.” *People v. Hopson, supra*, 3 Cal. 5th at 440, 396 P.3d at 1065, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 730 (dictum). *See id.* at 440-42, 396 P.3d at 1065-67, 219 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 730-32 (surveying caselaw on the issue). But those courts that have adopted such “an opening the door exception to the confrontation right have recognized it must be a limited one, lest the exception swallow the usual confrontation rule” (*id.* at 439, 396 P.3d at 1065, 219 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 730). *See id.* at 442, 396 P.3d at 1067, 219 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 732 (describing rulings to this effect in other jurisdictions and holding that “[s]imilarly, here, if the [prosecution’s] goal [in introducing a confession by a non-testifying co-perpetrator] were simply to correct an incomplete and misleading impression [by the defendant in her testimony] that . . . [the co-perpetrator’s] statements to defendant were the only statements that . . . [he] made about the crime, it would have sufficed to confirm that . . . [the co-perpetrator] later gave police a statement, ‘without the need to go into the damning details’ of what he said.”).

Crawford’s prohibition against the admission of out-of-court, inculpatory, testimonial statements is not limited to cases in which the prosecution offers the text of the statement *verbatim*. Testimony paraphrasing the statement, describing its contents, characterizing its purport, or otherwise conveying to the trier of fact the incriminating thrust of the statement also violates a defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights under *Crawford*. *See, e.g., Ocampo v. Vail*, 649 F.3d 1098, 1108-13 (9th Cir. 2011) and cases cited (“Our conclusion is that before *Crawford* it was clearly established that testimony from which one could determine the critical content of the out-of-court statement was sufficient to trigger Confrontation Clause concerns, and that, far from undermining that standard, *Crawford* established principles with which that aspect of the pre-*Crawford* Confrontation Clause jurisprudence are fully consistent.” *Id.* at 1108. “[I]t would be an unreasonable application of the core Confrontation Clause principle underlying *Crawford* to allow police officers to testify to the substance of an unavailable witness’s testimonial statements as long as they do so descriptively rather than verbatim or in detail.” *Id.* at 1109.); *State v. Swaney*, 787 N.W.2d 541, 554 (Minn. 2010) (the Confrontation Clause applies not only to out-of-court statements of the nontestifying declarant but also to any “testimony that inescapably implies a nontestifying witness’s testimonial hearsay statement”).

36.4. Admissibility of Evidence of Convictions, Other Crimes, or [Bad] Acts by the Defendant or a Witness for the Prosecution or Defense

36.4.1. Proof of Character, Propensity, Other Crimes or [Bad] Acts of the Defendant in the Prosecution's Case-in-Chief

Immemorial Anglo-American common-law practice forbids the prosecution to present evidence of a criminal defendant's character, reputation, or predisposition as the basis for an inference that s/he committed the offense for which s/he is presently being tried. That prohibition continues in virtually all jurisdictions today. FED. RULE EVID. 404(a)(1) illustrates its prevalent formulation: "Evidence of a person's character or character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait."

A parallel, pervasive prohibition has long forbidden proof of a defendant's prior convictions or of his or her commission of criminal or other "bad" acts distinct from the present charge for the purpose of demonstrating the likelihood that s/he committed the present charge. The latter rule is often described as having "exceptions" – as allowing, for example, proof of the defendant's identity as the perpetrator of the presently-charged offense by evidence that s/he committed criminal acts with a similar, signature *modus operandi* on other occasions. This conceptualization of the subject in terms of "exceptions" to a general rule prohibiting "other crime/other [bad]-act" evidence generally is good news for the defense if counsel can get the judge to buy it. But a more accurate analysis of the doctrine in most jurisdictions is that the rule prohibits prosecution evidence of a defendant's other crimes and bad behavior *only when that evidence is offered for the sole purpose of showing that the defendant is predisposed by character to commit a crime like the present one*; and that the point of the "exceptions" is that such evidence is admissible for any other purpose for which it is relevant (subject to limitations described in the following paragraphs). FED. RULE EVID. 404(b) illustrates the usual shape of this evidentiary restriction:

“[Rule 404](b) Crimes, Wrongs, or Other Acts.

“(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.

“(2) Permitted Uses This evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”

See also Edward J. Imwinkelried, *Criminal Minds: The Need to Refine the Application of the Doctrine of Objective Chances as a Justification for Introducing Uncharged Misconduct Evidence to Prove Intent*, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 851 (2017). The reason why we have bracketed the word "bad" in the preceding section titles and text is that, although that adjective or one of its synonyms was traditionally included in the statement of the common-law precept and is often thought by judges to be one of the precept's doctrinal elements, contemporary evidence rules like Rule 404(b)(1) explicitly refer to any "other act" – bad, good, or indifferent: – anything, in other words, that is not encompassed in the scenario comprising the present criminal charge, its setting, or its background. Two additional changes in the traditional treatment of this subject

were introduced by federal and state legislation and rules revisions beginning in the 1990's and are now widespread: *First*, a genuine exception to the prohibition of other-crime evidence to show propensity or predisposition was created for designated sex crimes (particularly sexual offenses against children). *See, e.g.*, FED. RULE EVID. 413(a), 414(a). *Second*, in cases in which other-crime-and-[bad]-act evidence is made admissible, the prosecution is often required to serve pretrial notice of such evidence on the defense (routinely or in response to a defense request). *See, e.g.*, FED. RULE EVID. 404(b)(2), 413(b), 414(b). The precise terms of these changes vary from State to State, as do the procedures which have evolved to permit defendants to enforce the applicable restrictions on the prosecution's use of "other crime/other [bad]-act" evidence. Particularly where pretrial notice of such evidence is required, courts are increasingly coming to entertain defense motions *in limine* seeking to exclude or limit such evidence. *See* § 17.5.3 *supra*; §§ 40.4.1, 40.5 *infra*. Local practice must be consulted.

The courts are usually fairly vigilant to enforce whatever restrictions local law imposes on the use of "other crime/other [bad]-act" evidence – and to exclude altogether proof of bad character traits through evidence of reputation or proof of criminal propensity through diagnostic or anecdotal evidence – because all jurisdictions recognize the historicity and fundamental principle of the rule "disallow[ing] resort by the prosecution to any kind of evidence of a defendant's evil character to establish a probability of his guilt" (*Michelson v. United States*, 335 U.S. 469 (1948)). *See, e.g.*, *Old Chief v. United States*, 519 U.S. 172, 180-82 (1997); *United States v. Wells*, 879 F.3d 900, 914, 917 (9th Cir. 2017) (the admission of the testimony of a forensic psychologist tendered as an expert in "targeted, intended workplace multiple-homicide violence" as the basis for "invit[ing] the jury to find a 'fit' between . . . [the expert's] criminal profile [testimony purporting to describe "the personality and other psychological characteristics of those who commit these types of crimes"] and the lay witnesses' testimony concerning . . . [the defendant's] own character traits" was reversible error; this testimony constituted forbidden bad-character evidence under Federal Evidence Rule 404(a)(1); the court reviews the state and federal caselaw rigorously limiting the admissibility of criminal-profile evidence to circumstances in which it is not used to show propensity); *Jackson v. State*, 166 So. 3d 195, 198-99 (Fla. App. 2015); *Amey v. State*, 331 Ga. App. 244, 248-54, 770 S.E.2d 321, 326-29 (2015); *People v. Ullah*, 216 Mich. App. 669, 550 N.W.2d 568 (1995); *State v. Hembree*, 368 N.C. 2, 13-14, 770 S.E.2d 77, 85 (2015); *State v. Jones*, 450 S.W.3d 866, 890-91 (Tenn. 2014); *State v. Thomas*, 152 Ohio St. 3d 15, 26, 92 N.E.3d 821, 831 (2017) (plurality opinion) ("the trial court committed plain error in admitting evidence that Thomas owned other knives unrelated to the murder. This evidence painted Thomas as someone with bad character and allowed the jury to convict him on the basis that he acted in conformity with it, violating Evid.R. 404(B)."); *cf. State v. Plain*, 898 N.W.2d 801, 822, 826-27 (Iowa 2017) (the prosecution introduced a redacted recording of a 911 call made during the criminal incident containing statements that the defendant "was wearing a GPS monitoring device and was not afraid to go 'back to prison'"; defense counsel, who had listened to the tape before trial but failed to object to these statements, listened again that evening, noted the statements and moved for a mistrial the next day; the Iowa Supreme Court holds the evidence inadmissible but finds that under the circumstances a curative instruction that in "the 911 recording, there may have been references to a GPS monitoring device and/or time spent in prison . . . [and t]he jury is to disregard any [such] statement[s]" was a sufficient corrective to obviate the need for a mistrial.); *and see McKinney v. Rees*, 993 F.2d 1378, 1385 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that admission of propensity evidence in a state murder trial

violated federal constitutional Due Process: “[T]he evidence in this case is emotionally charged. The prosecution used evidence of the Gerber knife, which could not possibly have been used to commit the murder, to help paint a picture of a young man with a fascination with knives and with a commando lifestyle. The prosecutor raised the issue on cross-examination of why McKinney had purchased a knife with a black blade, asking him whether it was because such knives are favored by commandos because they do not reflect light. The jury was offered the image of a man with a knife collection, who sat in his dormitory room sharpening knives, scratching morbid inscriptions on the wall, and occasionally venturing forth in camouflage with a knife strapped to his body. This evidence, as discussed above, was not relevant to the questions before the jury. It served only to prey on the emotions of the jury, to lead them to mistrust McKinney, and to believe more easily that he was the type of son who would kill his mother in her sleep without much apparent motive.”). And even when the “other crimes” evidence falls within one of the technically admissible categories, it is still subject to exclusion in the discretion of the trial judge if its prejudicial impact outweighs its probative value (see § 36.2.3 *supra*). *E.g.*, *United States v. Scott*, 677 F.3d 72, 74, 81, 82, 84 (2d Cir. 2012) (the trial court abused its discretion and committed reversible error by permitting the prosecution to introduce “testimony from two police detectives that they were familiar with . . . [the defendant] and had spoken to him on numerous occasions prior to his arrest in the instant case”: identity was not “an issue *in dispute*,” especially where it was conceded by defense counsel in opening statement, and “what little probative value this testimony may have had was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice” in that the jury would likely “assume that the defendant’s lengthy and numerous contacts with the police were . . . related to his bad character and criminal propensity.”); *State v. Brumbach*, 273 Or. App. 552, 359 P.3d 490 (2015), summarized in § 36.2.3 *supra*; *People v. Robinson*, 68 N.Y.2d 541, 549, 503 N.E.2d 485, 490, 510 N.Y.S.2d 837, 842 (1986) (“[p]rejudice involves both the nature of the crime, for the more heinous the uncharged crime, the more likely that jurors will be swayed by it, and the difficulty faced by the defendant in seeking to rebut the inference which the uncharged crime evidence brings into play”); *Campbell v. United States*, 450 A.2d 428, 430 (D.C. 1982).

If defense counsel elects to present character witnesses, this will ordinarily be deemed to open the door to the prosecution’s proof of bad character in rebuttal. See § 39.21 subdivision (4)(a) *infra*; see also §§ 36.4.2, 39.10 subdivision (J), 39.12 third paragraph *infra*. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 60.40(2). But any attempt by the prosecutor to introduce “other crime/other [bad]-act” evidence in the prosecution’s case-in-chief should be resisted under the principles of the preceding paragraph. Counsel can cite the very strong language found in a number of judicial opinions to the effect that the exclusion of such evidence is “one of the most fundamental notions known to our law” (*United States v. Beno*, 324 F.2d 582, 587 (2d Cir. 1963); see, e.g., *Ali v. United States*, 520 A.2d 306, 309-10 (D.C. 1987)), arising “out of the fundamental demand for justice and fairness which lies at the basis of our jurisprudence” (*Lovely v. United States*, 169 F.2d 386, 389 (4th Cir. 1948); see *State v. Melcher*, 140 N.H. 823, 830, 678 A.2d 146, 151 (1996)). And see *Michelson v. United States*, *supra*, 335 U.S. at 475-76 (“Courts that follow the common-law tradition almost unanimously have come to disallow resort by the prosecution to any kind of evidence of a defendant’s evil character to establish a probability of his guilt. . . . The overriding policy of excluding such evidence, despite its admitted probative value, is the practical experience that its disallowance tends to prevent confusion of issues, unfair surprise and undue prejudice.”); *State v. McCarthy*, 156 Vt. 148, 155, 589 A.2d 869, 873 (1991) (“Evidence

of uncharged crime creates a ‘grave danger of prejudice,’ . . . such that it is ‘the most prejudicial evidence imaginable against an accused’”); *McKinney v. Rees*, *supra*, 993 F.2d at 1381 (“The rule against using character evidence to show behavior in conformance therewith, or propensity, is one such historically grounded rule of evidence [*i.e.*, one of the “rules [that] are historically grounded rights of our system, developed to safeguard men from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting forfeitures of life, liberty and property”] (quoting *Brinegar v. United States*, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949)). It has persisted since at least 1684 to the present, and is now established not only in the California and federal evidence rules, but in the evidence rules of thirty-seven other states and in the common-law precedents of the remaining twelve states and the District of Columbia.”). Counsel also can draw upon caselaw which, in some jurisdictions, requires that the prosecution prove any admissible “other crimes” by a specified quantum of evidence. *See, e.g., Ali v. United States*, *supra*, 520 A.2d at 310 n.4 (in order to use “other crimes” evidence, the prosecution must present, at a pretrial hearing, clear and convincing evidence that the accused committed the other crime); TENN. RULE EVID. 404(b)(3) (same quantum).

Defense counsel who is representing a defendant with a record of prior arrests or convictions must be constantly on guard throughout the trial to avoid the accidental exposure of that record to the trier of fact. Numerous documents that may be offered as prosecution exhibits for other purposes – *e.g.*, comparison fingerprint cards; photographs of the defendant at the time of arrest – may contain notations of the defendant’s record. Counsel should inspect each exhibit carefully and take the time to read it as soon as it is marked for identification, before it is discussed or displayed in open court. S/he should be sure to look at the back of every exhibit. If matter relating to inadmissible arrests or convictions appears on an otherwise admissible exhibit, counsel should suggest some means of reproducing the exhibit without the prejudicial matter. In a jury trial, these suggestions should be made at the bench, outside the earshot of the jury; and, if extended discussion of the suggestion is likely, counsel should request that admission of the exhibit be postponed until the matter can be taken up *in camera* during a lunch break or other normal recess in the trial. (Protracted sidebar discussions of an exhibit while the jury is present in the courtroom with nothing to do but speculate about what’s going on will often lead some jurors to guess that the defense is hiding something from them.) In a bench trial, counsel should first attempt to arrange a sanitized reproduction of the exhibit by agreement with the prosecutor before the exhibit is shown to the judge. If the prosecutor does not agree to this, counsel should then ask the court to order the exclusion and excision of the inadmissible matter without inspecting it, so as to avoid possible prejudice. In jurisdictions in which the court file (which judges often peruse during the trial) normally contains papers showing the defendant’s prior record or is marked in some manner to cross-reference the defendant’s other cases, counsel should examine the file carefully before trial and, if necessary, ask that the judge in a bench trial refrain from viewing the file in order to avoid exposure to inadmissible evidence.

36.4.2. Proof of the Defendant’s Prior Convictions or Prior [Bad] Acts for Impeachment or in Rebuttal

The standard rule is that a defendant who testifies may be impeached with certain prior convictions. Ordinarily, any conviction of a felony or *crimen falsi* can be used for this purpose, but some jurisdictions disallow convictions that are more than a specified number of years old or allow these “stale” convictions only under designated circumstances (for example, when the

nature of the crime makes them particularly probative of lack of credibility). *See, e.g.*, FED. RULE EVID. 609(a), (b). The proper method of impeachment is usually for the prosecutor to ask the defendant on cross-examination whether s/he was convicted of a specified crime on a specified date. If s/he denies the conviction or says that s/he does not remember, the prosecutor can subsequently introduce a certified judgment of conviction in rebuttal.

Federally unconstitutional convictions cannot be used for impeachment purposes. *Loper v. Beto*, 405 U.S. 473 (1972). *See also Lewis v. United States*, 445 U.S. 55, 60, 66-67 (1980) (dictum); *State v. Saunders*, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 865, 744 N.E.2d 74 (2001); *State v. Varszegi*, 236 Conn. 266, 271-78, 673 A.2d 90, 93-96 (1996) (dictum); *People v. Cabassa*, 186 Misc.2d 200, 203-08, 717 N.Y.S.2d 487, 490-93 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cty. 2000) (dictum). Some state courts may also permit collateral attack upon the defendant's priors on state-law grounds. *See, e.g., State v. Hudson*, 185 Wash. App. 1010, 2014 WL 7442673 (2014).

Prior *arrests* cannot be used to impeach a defendant. Unlike convictions, arrests do not tend to show guilt, and they are not admissible for any purpose that requires reasoning from the arrest to guilt of the offense for which the arrest was made. *People v. Cook*, 37 N.Y.2d 591, 596, 338 N.E.2d 619, 621, 376 N.Y.S.2d 110, 113-14 (1975) (“Impeachment of a witness by evidence or inquiry as to prior arrests or charges is clearly improper. The mere fact that a person has been previously charged or accused has no probative value. There is absolutely no logical connection between a prior unproven charge and that witness’ [sic] credibility.”). *See, e.g., People v. Anderson*, 20 Cal. 3d 647, 574 P.2d 1235, 143 Cal.Rptr. 88 (1978); *People v. Brown*, 61 Ill. App. 3d 180, 377 N.E.2d 1201, 18 Ill. Dec. 565 (1978); *Commonwealth v. Levene*, 492 Pa. 287, 290-91, 424 A.2d 865, 866 (1980); *Powell v. State*, 673 S.W.2d 403 (Tex. App. 1984). However, if the defendant on direct examination volunteers that s/he has never been arrested – or testifies that s/he “has never been in trouble with the law,” or makes similar claims – this testimony opens the door to impeachment by prior arrests (*e.g., State v. Thomas*, 878 S.W.2d 76 (Mo. App. 1994); see § 39.12 third paragraph *infra*), to the extent (but only to the extent) that they controvert these protestations (*see Modeste v. State*, 760 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. App. 2000); *People v. Brown, supra*, 61 Ill. App. 3d at 184, 377 N.E.2d at 1203-04, 18 Ill. Dec. at 567-68; *West v. State*, 169 S.W.3d 275, 278-79 (Tex. App. 2005) (dictum)).

In most States, a juvenile delinquency adjudication cannot be used to impeach either a defendant in a criminal trial or a juvenile respondent in a delinquency trial. This result is dictated in some States by statutes prohibiting the use of a juvenile adjudication in any subsequent proceeding (*see, e.g., Moore v. State*, 333 So. 2d 165 (Ala. Crim. App. 1976)); in other States it is produced by statutes or caselaw excluding juvenile adjudications from the category of “convictions” that are admissible for impeachment (*see, e.g., FED. RULE EVID. 609(d)(2); People v. Massie*, 137 Ill. App. 3d 723, 484 N.E.2d 1213, 92 Ill. Dec. 358 (1985); *People v. Peele*, 12 N.Y.2d 890, 188 N.E.2d 265, 237 N.Y.S.2d 999 (1963); *State in the Interest of K.P.*, 167 N.J. Super. 290, 400 A.2d 840 (1979); *State v. Matthews*, 6 Wash. App. 201, 492 P.2d 1076 (1971)); and in still other States, it is a reflection of a general evidentiary rule of confidentiality of juvenile adjudications. However, some jurisdictions view the accused’s presentation of good-character evidence (see §§ 39.21-39.24 *infra*) as opening the door to the prosecution’s questioning of the character witnesses about the accused’s otherwise inadmissible prior adjudications of delinquency, insofar as these are pertinent to the character trait that the accused

has put in issue. *See, e.g., Wilburn v. State*, 289 Ark. 224, 711 S.W.2d 760 (1986).

In virtually all jurisdictions, the trial judge has discretion to disallow impeachment by prior convictions that would be unduly prejudicial. This discretion may be expressly conferred by statute or court rule (*see, e.g.,* FED. RULE EVID. 609(d)(2); *State v. Doppler*, 828 N.W.2d 502, 505-07 (N.D. 2013); *Peterson v. State*, 518 So. 2d 632, 635-37 (Miss. 1987); *State v. Jones*, 101 Wash. 2d 113, 116-23, 677 P.2d 131, 134-37 (1984), *partially overruled on an unrelated point, State v. Brown*, 113 Wash. 2d 520, 782 P.2d 1013 (1989)), or it may derive from the judge's general power to exclude otherwise admissible evidence when the prejudicial impact of the evidence substantially outweighs its probative value. *See* § 36.2.3 *supra*. The following factors are usually recognized in caselaw or local conventions as calling for the exclusion of a prior conviction in the exercise of this discretion:

- (1) That the prior conviction is for an offense closely similar to the offense with which the defendant is presently charged, so that the jury is particularly likely to draw the forbidden “inference that the past conviction suggests some probability that defendant committed the similar offense for which he is currently charged” (*United States v. Beahm*, 664 F.2d 414, 419 (4th Cir.1981); *and see, e.g., State v. Bryant*, 369 S.C. 511, 633 S.E.2d 152 (2006)).
- (2) That the prior conviction is for an offense that would appear particularly repugnant to the ordinary juror (*see United States v. Beahm, supra*, 664 F.2d at 416, 419 (prior conviction for “unnatural and perverted sexual practices” was “an odious one likely to inflame the jury and thus prejudice defendant”)).
- (3) That the prior conviction is for an offense that has relatively little bearing on a convicted person's propensity to testify truthfully or falsely (*see, e.g., State v. Waller*, 118 S.W.3d 368, 371-73 (Tenn. 2003) (dictum)).
- (4) That the prior conviction occurred many years ago (*see, e.g., Triplett v. State*, 881 So. 2d 303, 307 (Miss. App. 2004) (dictum)), particularly if the defendant was young at the time and has stayed out of trouble since (*see, e.g., State v. Jones, supra*, 101 Wash. 2d at 121, 677 P.2d at 137 (among “other important factors for the trial court to consider . . . [is] the age and circumstances of the defendant – was the defendant very young, were there extenuating circumstances?”)).
- (5) That the defendant's credibility is not a central issue in the case (*see, e.g., State v. Jones, supra*, 101 Wash. 2d at 121, 677 P.2d at 137 (“the more crucial the defendant's testimony, the more crucial it is that the jury not be misled as to the defendant's credibility”)) – because, for example, (a) the defendant has testified only to matters which are not strongly controverted by the prosecution or (b) the defendant's testimony is corroborated by particularly believable defense witnesses.

In some jurisdictions, a witness – including the defendant – can be impeached not only with prior convictions but also with “prior [bad] acts” that did not result in a criminal conviction

if (1) these acts are probative of lack of veracity, and (2) their probative value outweighs their prejudice to the defendant. The cross-examiner is permitted to ask the witness whether s/he committed a specified [bad] act on a specified date. But if the witness denies the prior act, most such jurisdictions bar the cross-examiner's introduction of extrinsic evidence to prove the prior [bad] act; the usual rule is that the cross-examiner is bound by the witness's answer. *See, e.g.,* FED. RULE EVID. 608(b). It is not a condition of this kind of cross-examination that the cross-examiner be able to prove the prior [bad] act by competent evidence apart from the witness's answers on cross. Rather, the cross-examiner is permitted to ask the questions whenever s/he can satisfy the judge that s/he has a good-faith basis for believing that the witness committed the prior [bad] act. If the alleged [bad] act was the subject of a criminal charge that ultimately resulted in an acquittal or a dismissal on the merits at trial, counsel can take the position that the prosecutor cannot possibly have a "good faith" basis for using it to impeach the defendant (*see, e.g., People v. Plaisted*, 2 A.D.3d 906, 908, 767 N.Y.S.2d 518, 521 (N.Y. App. Div., 3d Dep't 2003)), and that, in any event, the fact of acquittal or dismissal on the merits "normally alter[s] the balance between probative force and prejudice" and renders the evidence more prejudicial than probative (*United States v. Schwab*, 886 F.2d 509, 511-13 (2d Cir. 1989)). If the [bad] act is the subject of a *pending* criminal charge, the Fifth Amendment bars the prosecutor from questioning the accused about the act for the purpose of impeaching credibility, and this bar extends until at least conviction of that offense and, if an appeal is taken, the final affirmance of the conviction on direct appeal. *See, e.g., People v. Cantave*, 21 N.Y.3d 374, 377, 380, 993 N.E.2d 1257, 1260, 1262, 971 N.Y.S.2d 237, 239, 241 (2013).

36.4.3. Defense Impeachment of Prosecution Witnesses with Prior Convictions or Prior [Bad] Acts

State evidentiary rules and the confrontation clauses of the state and federal constitutions give the defendant a right to impeach a prosecution witness with the witness's adult convictions pertinent to lack of veracity:

“Our cases construing the [confrontation] clause [of the Sixth Amendment] hold that a primary interest secured by it is the right of cross-examination.’ . . . Subject always to the broad discretion of a trial judge to preclude repetitive and unduly harassing interrogation, the cross-examiner is not only permitted to delve into the witness’ [sic] story to test the witness’ [sic] perceptions and memory, but the cross-examiner has traditionally been allowed to impeach, *i.e.*, discredit, the witness. One way of discrediting the witness is to introduce evidence of a prior criminal conviction of that witness. By so doing the cross-examiner intends to afford the jury [or the judge in a bench trial] a basis to infer that the witness’ [sic] character is such that he would be less likely than the average trustworthy citizen to be truthful in his testimony.” (*Davis v. Alaska*, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974).)

See also, e.g., Slovik v. Yates, 556 F.3d 747, 752-54 (9th Cir. 2009); *Vasquez v. Jones*, 496 F.3d 564, 570-74 (6th Cir. 2007).

Juvenile adjudications of a prosecution witness (whether that witness is presently an adult or still a juvenile) are ordinarily barred from impeachment use by the sorts of exclusionary provisions described in § 36.4.2 fourth paragraph *supra*. But these provisions must give way to

the accused's constitutional rights to confrontation in certain cases. In *Davis v. Alaska, supra*, the Supreme Court held that the defense was entitled to use a juvenile witness's prior adjudication, for which he was on probation at the time he implicated the defendant, to cross-examine on the subject of bias – specifically, to show that the witness's probationary status gave him reason to make a false identification in order to avoid antagonizing the authorities and jeopardizing the continuation of his probation. The Court explained that “[t]he State’s policy interest in protecting the confidentiality of a juvenile offender’s record cannot require yielding of so vital a constitutional right as the effective cross-examination for bias of an adverse witness” (415 U.S. at 320). “Whatever temporary embarrassment might result to [the witness] . . . or his family by disclosure of his juvenile record . . . is outweighed by [the accused’s] . . . right to probe into the influence of possible bias in the testimony of a crucial identification witness.” *Id.* at 319. *See also, e.g., In re Douglas L.*, 625 A.2d 1357 (R.I. 1993).

The *Davis* decision was explicitly limited to the use of juvenile adjudications that showed bias. However, several lower courts have applied *Davis*'s logic to permit impeachment of prosecution witnesses with prior juvenile adjudications that reflect adversely on the witness's general credibility. *See, e.g., Tabron v. United States*, 444 A.2d 942, 943 (D.C. 1982) (if impeachment of a witness's general credibility is “‘likely to be material to the outcome’ of the trial”); *State v. Deffenbaugh*, 217 Kan. 469, 472-74, 536 P.2d 1030, 1034 (1975) (if the juvenile adjudication is for an offense involving dishonesty or false statement); *State v. Hillard*, 421 So. 2d 220 (La. 1982) (if the court determines, on a case-by-case basis, that the accused's right to confrontation outweighs the state's policy of confidentiality).

FED. RULE EVID. 608(b) and parallel provisions in States that have followed the lead of the Federal Rules permit a cross-examiner to inquire into “specific instances of a witness's conduct . . . if they are probative of the [witness's] character for . . . untruthfulness,” but forbid extrinsic evidence of such incidents. Counsel can argue that the federal and state constitutional rights to confrontation also entitle the defense to cross-examine a prosecution witness with respect to any prior [bad] acts (whether committed as an adult or juvenile) that tend to show the witness's general untrustworthiness. *See, e.g., People v. Smith*, 27 N.Y.3d 652, 659, 666, 669, 57 N.E.3d 53, 57, 62, 64, 36 N.Y.S.3d 861, 865, 870, 872 (2016) (the trial judges in cases that were joined on appeal abused their discretion by precluding defense counsel from using the State's “prior bad acts” rule to (in one case) “question Detective Sanchez regarding a lawsuit in which he and the rest of the narcotics field team involved in this case were sued in federal court for civil rights violations” in an unrelated civil suit alleging false arrest, excessive force, and fabrication of evidence, and (in another case) to cross-examine “Detective Rivera about . . . prior false arrests based upon the specific allegations of . . . [an unrelated] federal lawsuit”; “law enforcement witnesses should be treated in the same manner as any other prosecution witness for purposes of cross-examination.”); *People v. Batista*, 113 A.D.2d 890, 493 N.Y.S.2d 608 (N.Y. App. Div., 2d Dep't 1985) (the trial court erred in precluding the defense from impeaching a prosecution witness with his illegal gambling activities and failure to carry a green card). *See also United States v. Woodard*, 699 F.3d 1188, 1192, 1195-97 (10th Cir. 2012) (the trial court violated the defendant's right to confrontation by preventing defense counsel from questioning a state Motor Transportation Division inspector about “a prior determination made by a different federal district judge [at a suppression hearing] that the MTD inspector was not credible”); *United States v. White*, 692 F.3d 235, 248-51 (2d Cir. 2012) (the trial court improperly prevented

defense counsel from cross-examining a police officer about his testimony at a suppression hearing in an unrelated case that resulted in the judge's "unequivocally discredit[ing] . . . [the officer's] testimony"). And certainly the defense can impeach with any prior [bad] acts or pending charges that tend to show bias on the part of a witness. *See, e.g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall*, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) (the trial court's refusal to permit cross-examination of a prosecution witness about the terms of an agreement under which a drunk driving charge against him was dismissed in exchange for his promise to speak to the prosecutor about the crime for which the defendant was on trial violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation); *Brinson v. Walker*, 547 F.3d 387, 390, 394-95 (2d Cir. 2008) (the trial judge violated the Confrontation Clause by preventing defense counsel from cross-examining the complainant "on whether he was fired from his job at . . . [a restaurant] for refusing to serve black patrons," information which defense counsel sought to elicit to support a defense theory that the complainant's "accusation [that he had been robbed by the defendant] was a deliberate lie, motivated by . . . [the complainant's] racial hatred of black people"); *Bentley v. State*, 930 A.2d 866, 869, 871-72, 874-75 (Del. 2007) (the trial court violated the defendant's rights to confrontation and to a fair trial by upholding a prosecution witness's assertion of her Fifth Amendment privilege and precluding defense counsel from cross-examining the witness, who had pending drug charges, about the witness's prior drug use, which defense counsel sought to elicit to "cast into doubt . . . [the witness's] ability to perceive or remember" and to "establish bias or motive for the changes in her testimony"; the state could have avoided "[t]he substantial danger of prejudice from the preclusion of cross examination . . . [by seeking] use immunity for [the witness's] testimony."); *Longus v. United States*, 52 A.3d 836, 851-54 (D.C. 2012) (the trial court improperly prevented defense counsel from cross-examining a police detective about two theories of potential bias: questioning to show that the detective "was under investigation by the U.S. Attorney for witness coaching," which "provided a motive for the detective to want to curry favor with the government"; and questioning "to show his 'corruption' through evidence that Detective Brown had . . . engaged in witness tampering in the . . . [other] case"); *Washington v. United States*, 461 A.2d 1037, 1038 (D.C. 1983) (even in the absence of a testimonial arrangement between the witness and the prosecutor, a pending charge against the witness may be used to show bias in the form of the witness's "harbor[ing] a hope of better treatment if he testified as he did"); *State v. Clark*, 364 S.W.3d 540, 544-45 (Mo. 2012) (defense counsel was entitled to cross-examine a prosecution witness about having pled guilty to unrelated charges and his hope that "he would reap a benefit" from testifying for the state even though there was no plea agreement to that effect; the witness's "belief that his testimony would have a favorable effect on future sentencing may have been mistaken or speculative, but what is important is what he believed."); *cf. Davis v. Alaska*, *supra*, 415 U.S. at 319-20.

For additional discussion of these forms of impeachment, see § 37.5 *infra*.

36.4.4. Defense Evidence of Prior Convictions or Prior [Bad] Acts of the Complainant or Other Participants in the Criminal Episode

The defense can prove any convictions or [bad] acts of any person that are otherwise relevant to the defendant's theory of the case, such as a complainant's prior assaults in a case in which the defendant asserts self-defense and seeks to use the complainant's violent history to show that s/he was the aggressor or to show the reasonableness of the defendant's fear. *See, e.g.,*

McBride v. United States, 441 A.2d 644 (D.C. 1982); *see also People v. Petty*, 7 N.Y.3d 277, 285, 852 N.E.2d 1155, 1161, 819 N.Y.S.2d 684, 689-90 (2006) (in a self-defense case, the defendant can introduce “evidence of a deceased victim’s prior threats against defendant . . . to prove that the victim was the initial aggressor, whether or not such threats . . . [were] communicated to defendant,” because “such threats may indicate an intent to act upon them, thereby creating a probability that the deceased victim has in fact acted upon them as the initial aggressor”).

36.4.5. Prosecutorial Impeachment of Defense Witnesses with Prior Convictions or Prior [Bad] Acts

The same principles that permit the defense to impeach prosecution witnesses with prior convictions and [bad] acts (see § 36.4.3 *supra*) entitle the prosecution to impeach defense witnesses with prior convictions and, in some jurisdictions, with prior [bad] acts. *But see State v. Scott*, 229 N.J. 469, 163 A.3d 325 (2017) (prosecution evidence that the defendant’s mother, testifying as a defense witness, had lied to police on two previous occasions to assist her son in evading prosecution was inadmissible to impeach her; the court rejects the state’s argument that this evidence went to “bias”; it holds, instead, that the evidence constituted an impermissible means of proving character for untruthfulness and that it was substantially more prejudicial than probative).

As § 36.4.2 fourth paragraph *supra* explains, the vast majority of jurisdictions prohibit prosecutorial impeachment of an accused with prior juvenile adjudications. Some courts have, however, relied upon the rationale of *Davis v. Alaska*, *supra*, to permit the prosecution to impeach other defense witnesses with their prior juvenile adjudications. *See People v. Puente*, 98 Ill. App. 3d 936, 424 N.E.2d 775, 54 Ill. Dec. 25 (1981) (superseded by statute, *see In re K.D.*, 279 Ill App. 3d 1020, 1024, 666 N.E.2d 29, 32, 216 Ill. Dec. 861, 864 (1996)); *State v. Wilkins*, 215 Kan. 145, 523 P.2d 728 (1974). This extrapolation from *Davis* is inconsistent with *Davis*’s holding and logic: *Davis* was predicated upon the accused’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, and the prosecution has no constitutional right to confrontation. *See, e.g., State v. Thomas*, 536 S.W.2d 529, 531 (Mo. App. 1976); *Commonwealth v. Slaughter*, 482 Pa. 538, 552, 394 A.2d 453, 460 (1978). Accordingly, the interests in confidentiality that Alaska advanced in *Davis* as a basis for excluding juvenile adjudications should ordinarily preclude the prosecution from impeaching a defense witness with prior juvenile adjudications. *See Davis v. Alaska*, *supra*, 415 U.S. at 319 (“The State argues that exposure of a juvenile’s record of delinquency would likely cause impairment of rehabilitative goals of the juvenile correctional procedures. This exposure, it is argued, might encourage the juvenile offender to commit further acts of delinquency, or cause the juvenile offender to lose employment opportunities or otherwise suffer unnecessarily for his youthful transgression.”).

36.5. Codefendants’, Co-conspirators’, and Other Accomplices’ Statements

36.5.1. Admissibility of Co-conspirators’ Declarations

Section 36.3.2 *supra* explained the general operation of the hearsay rule and its exceptions. A hearsay exception that is frequently invoked in criminal trials is a particularized

version of the rule admitting out-of-court declarations of a party's agent against the party. For purposes of this rule, co-conspirators are treated as mutual agents, and declarations made by one conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy are admissible against others. In most jurisdictions the principle is applied to admit these hearsay declarations once a *prima facie* showing of conspiracy is made, whether or not conspiracy has been formally charged against the defendant. As noted in § 36.3.3 fifth paragraph *supra*, the Supreme Court has not yet resolved the question of whether statements by a co-conspirator made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy are non-testimonial and thus outside the ambit of Confrontation Clause protections. *See Crawford v. Washington*, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004); *see also id.* at 58 (discussing *Bourjaily v. United States*, 483 U.S. 171 (1987)).

When dealing with a prosecutor's invocation of the special rules for co-conspirators' declarations, counsel should keep in mind that:

(1) A condition of the admissibility of a co-conspirator's declaration is that a *prima facie* showing of conspiracy has been made. It is not sufficient that the declarant and defendant are each charged as principals to the same offense. Conspiratorial agreement must appear. *E.g.*, *People v. Bac Tran*, 80 N.Y.2d 170, 603 N.E.2d 950, 589 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1992); *Jenkins v. United States*, 80 A.3d 978 (D.C. 2013).

(2) The co-conspirator's declarations are admissible only if made within the duration of the conspiracy. Arrest of a conspirator is ordinarily viewed as terminating the conspiracy, or at least the arrested conspirator's part in it, for this purpose. The frequently heard prosecutorial contention that a criminal conspiracy implies a subsidiary conspiracy to conceal the crime and that the latter endures the dissolution of the former upon completion of the criminal exercise or apprehension of the conspirator has been rejected in federal criminal trials by the Supreme Court. *Krulewitch v. United States*, 336 U.S. 440 (1949). Although the Court refused in *Dutton v. Evans*, 400 U.S. 74 (1970), to constitutionalize the *Krulewitch* rule as an inflexible canon of Sixth Amendment Confrontation law, the *Dutton* decision is badly muddled by multiple opinions and multiple grounds, leaving open the strong possibility that at least some of the more extreme extensions of the States' "co-conspirator" doctrines will be held unconstitutional. A *dictum* in *Bourjaily v. United States*, *supra*, glosses *Dutton* as permitting post-arrest co-conspirators' declarations only upon a showing of particularized "indicia of reliability." *See Bourjaily*, *supra*, 483 U.S. at 183 (characterizing *Dutton* as holding that a "reliability inquiry [is] required where [the state] evidentiary rule deviates from [the] common-law approach, admitting co-conspirators' hearsay statements made after termination of [the] conspiracy"). And the reasoning of *United States v. Inadi*, 475 U.S. 387 (1986), plainly implies that the co-conspirator's unavailability at the time of trial must be shown as well. The States obviously cannot be free to treat the suppositious "concealment phase" of a conspiracy as continuing through the time of trial (although its logic goes that far), since this would nullify the holdings of *Bruton v. United States*, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), and *Roberts v. Russell*, 392 U.S. 293 (1968), and of *Lee v. Illinois*, 476 U.S. 530 (1986) (discussed in § 23.9.1 *supra* and in § 36.5.2 *infra*). It remains to be seen where the constitutional line will be drawn between *Dutton* and *Bruton*. *Crawford's* reinvention of Sixth Amendment Confrontation jurisprudence is a wild card in this calculus. *See* § 36.3.3 *supra*. In the meantime the very uncertainty of that line provides a persuasive argument that the state courts should adopt the safe and readily administrable *Krulewitch* rule – that all postarrest

declarations of a conspirator are inadmissible against co-conspirators – as a matter of state law. *See, e.g., State v. Rivenbark*, 311 Md. 147, 152-60, 533 A.2d 271, 273-77 (1987).

Even if made during the conspiracy, a declaration is inadmissible unless made to further the aims of the conspiracy. The rule of thumb, used by a number of trial judges, that admits any statement of a conspirator before dissolution of the conspiracy is erroneous. Co-conspirators' statements are admissible only "when made in the course *and* in furtherance of the conspiracy" (*Bourjaily v. United States*, *supra*, 483 U.S. at 183 (emphasis added)). *See, e.g., State v. Anders*, 331 S.C. 474, 503 S.E.2d 443 (1998).

36.5.2. Admissibility of Codefendants' Declarations at a Joint Trial

Section 23.9.1 *supra* describes the *Bruton* doctrine, which governs cases in which the prosecution offers evidence of a codefendant's out-of-court statements implicating the defendant. As explained there, in any trial in which the codefendant will not testify, *Bruton* effectuates the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine the codefendant as a declarant by requiring either severance of the codefendant's trial or redaction of the statements to eliminate any reference to the defendant. *See, e.g., Orlando v. Nassau Cty. Dist. Attorney's Office*, 915 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2019) (reversing a conviction for *Bruton* error where officers who had simultaneously interrogated the defendant and an accomplice testified that the defendant changed his initial statement when confronted with conflicting statements of the accomplice; despite a jury instruction that the contents of the accomplice's statements were not being admitted for their truth but only to provide context for the defendant's change of story, their admission violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation: "Although the non-testifying witness in *Bruton* was a codefendant in a joint trial, *Bruton* applies equally to the testimonial and incriminating statements of non-testifying accomplices tried separately." *Id.* at 122.).

As § 23.9.1 further explains, some courts take the view that the *Bruton* rule does not apply in bench trials. Such rulings typically are based on the rationale that a judicial trier of fact is capable of applying the codefendant's confession solely to the determination of the codefendant's guilt. But *Lee v. Illinois*, 476 U.S. 530 (1986), provides a basis for challenging that premise and urging that *Bruton* should extend to bench trials. *See, again, § 23.9.1.* If a judge at a joint bench trial nonetheless permits the introduction of a codefendant's statement implicating the defendant, it is clear that any "use [of the] hearsay evidence as substantive evidence against the [defendant]" (*Lee v. Illinois, supra*, 476 U.S. at 542) would violate the defendant's constitutional right to confrontation (*id.* at 542-46). *See, e.g., In re Appeal No. 977 from Circuit Court of Baltimore County*, 22 Md. App. 511, 323 A.2d 663 (1974); *In the Matter of Quinton A.*, 49 N.Y.2d 328, 338-39, 402 N.E.2d 126, 131-32, 425 N.Y.S.2d 788, 793-94 (1980); *W.B. v. State*, 356 So. 2d 884 (Fla. App. 1978). As the Court explained in *Lee v. Illinois, supra*, in ruling that the use of a codefendant's statement to convict the defendant in a bench trial violated this Sixth Amendment right, "a codefendant's confession is presumptively unreliable as to the passages detailing the defendant's conduct or culpability because those passages may well be the product of the codefendant's desire to shift or spread blame, curry favor, avenge himself, or divert attention to another" (476 U.S. at 545). *See also Lilly v. Virginia*, 527 U.S. 116, 127-28, 131-34 (1999) (plurality opinion). Moreover, since the portions of the codefendant's statement

implicating the defendant cannot be used as substantive evidence against the defendant and have little probative value in establishing the codefendant's guilt, counsel can argue that these "presumptively unreliable . . . passages" (*Lee v. Illinois, supra*, 476 U.S. at 545) should be excluded from evidence altogether. Counsel can argue that, notwithstanding the judge's capacity to disregard this evidence in deciding the defendant's guilt, such redaction is a reasonable prophylactic measure to prevent even the possibility of prejudice to the defendant. See § 36.2.3 *supra* and § 40.5 *infra*; see also § 22.5 *supra*.

(If the prosecution seeks to introduce an out-of-court statement by an accomplice who is *not* being tried jointly with defendant and who is not testifying at trial, the statement will ordinarily be barred by both local hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause (see §§ 36.3.2, 36.3.3 *supra*) unless it comes within the exception for co-conspirators' statements made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy (see § 36.5.1 *supra*).

In cases in which an accomplice testifies for the prosecution, there are no hearsay or confrontation problems because the accomplice is available for cross-examination by the defendant's attorney. There are, however, state-law doctrines prohibiting conviction of a defendant solely on the basis of the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. See § 41.2.2 subdivision (2) *infra*. In a case in which a codefendant pleads guilty during the trial and then is called to the witness stand by the prosecution to testify against the defendant, counsel should request that the judge impose whatever limitations on the testimony are needed to exclude information the former codefendant may have learned as a result of joint defense planning, and counsel also should seek whatever jury instructions are needed to guard against prejudice from the former codefendant's guilty plea and change of status. See *United States v. Barret*, 848 F.3d 524, 533-34 (2d Cir. 2017).

36.6. Competency of a Child Witness

In some criminal trials, a child witness may be so young that his or her competency to testify comes into question. "A number of States . . . mandate by statute that a trial judge assess a child's competency to testify on the basis of specified requirements. These usually include a determination that the child is capable of expression, is capable of understanding the duty to tell the truth, and is capable of receiving just impressions of the facts about which he or she is called to testify." *Kentucky v. Stincer*, 482 U.S. 730, 742 n.12 (1987) (citing to representative statutes). "Some States explicitly allow children to testify without requiring a prior competency qualification, while others simply provide that all persons, including children, are deemed competent unless otherwise limited by statute." *Id.*

Most States that provide for competency inquiries follow the general rule that "[t]here is no precise age which determines the question of competency [and that] . . . [t]his depends on the capacity and intelligence of the child, his appreciation of the difference between truth and falsehood, as well as of his duty to tell the former" (*id.* at 741 n.11 (quoting *Wheeler v. United States*, 159 U.S. 523, 524 (1895))). Some States, however, specify that children below a certain age are presumptively incompetent. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 60.20(2) ("[a] witness less than nine years old may not testify under oath unless the court is satisfied that he or she understands the nature of an oath"); *People v. Carrington*, 18 Misc.3d 1147(A), 859 N.Y.S.2d

897, 2008 WL 650055, at *8 (N.Y. Cty. Court, Westchester Cty. 2008) (granting the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment because the court finds, "[b]ased upon an *in-camera* review of the grand jury minutes, the child's videotaped testimony, court file, motion papers and case law, . . . that the prosecutor improperly allowed the seven (7) year old child [witness] to testify as if under oath" and "there is no other corroborating evidence, on this record, that was presented to the Grand Jury").

The inquiry into competency usually takes the form of a *voir dire*, conducted when the child witness takes the stand (in some jurisdictions after the child has been administered the oath, in other jurisdictions as a prerequisite for the administration of the oath). If the child is a witness whom the prosecution seeks to present at trial, the qualifying questions are asked by either the prosecutor or the judge, and defense counsel is afforded the opportunity to cross-examine; if the child is a defense witness, either defense counsel or the judge will ask the qualifying questions, and the prosecutor will be allowed to cross-examine. "Children often are asked their names, where they go to school, how old they are, whether they know who the judge is, whether they know what a lie is, and whether they know what happens when one tells a lie." *Kentucky v. Stincer*, *supra*, 482 U.S. at 741. *See also Harris v. Thompson*, 698 F.3d 609, 640-43 (7th Cir. 2012) (recognizing that in cases in which the defense plans to present a child witness who will be subject to a competency inquiry, defense counsel's preparation for the competency hearing should include at least the following: "[i]nterviewing . . . [the child witness] in advance . . . to familiarize . . . [the child] with the types of questions he would be asked" at the hearing; "anticipat[ing] the State's approach in challenging competency"; and "developing a rapport with an understandably nervous and reticent child").

When defense counsel plans to challenge the competency of a child witness called by the prosecution, counsel should request that the *voir dire* on competency be held out of the presence of the jury. This request should be made at a pretrial conference or at the outset of the trial, before the jurors are brought in. *See* §§ 18.14, 35.2 *supra*. Jurors will not take well to watching a defense attorney interrogate a child and succeed in excluding his or her testimony.

In cross-examining a prosecutor's child witness on *voir dire* for the purpose of showing that the witness is not competent to testify, counsel should consider exploring the following lines of cross-examination: (a) whether the child has told lies to his or her parent or other relatives or friends without the other individual ever finding out that s/he told a lie (this question can serve as a lead-in to the ultimate inquiry whether the child understands that lying is wrong; if the ultimate question is asked without a run-up, it is likely to get a canned affirmative answer); (b) if the child is very young, whether s/he believes that certain cartoon characters s/he watches on television are "real"; (c) what grade level s/he is in at school, whether s/he is in special education, and what types of grades s/he receives (for the purpose of arguing that the witness's educational deficits impair his or her competency to testify to a greater extent than his or her age alone would) and (d) whether the child has been coached by the prosecutor on what to say in the competency inquiry. *See, e.g., In re J.M.*, 2006 WL 649627, at *5 (Ohio App. 2006) (the trial court abused its discretion by deeming the 12-year-old complainant to be competent to testify, based on routine *voir dire* questions and without thoroughly "delving . . . into the key issue of competency," despite "indications that [the witness] was in special education classes, that she had and continued to have imaginary friends, that she had at least one past diagnosis of schizophrenia,

and that her ability to recollect even routine information such as the day, month, and year was severely limited”); *cf. Perry v. Commonwealth*, 390 S.W.3d 122, 127-28 (Ky. 2013) (the trial court violated “due process and fundamental fairness” by denying the defense’s motion for “an independent psychological evaluation” of the child complainant, which “raised the issue of . . . [the child complainant’s] competency to testify in light of possible mental problems and effects of the psychotropic drugs he was taking” and “argued that . . . [the child complainant] did not know the difference between truth and a lie”).

36.7. Stipulations and Stipulated Trials

36.7.1. Stipulations

Counsel should always keep in mind the possibility of offering to stipulate to matters that the prosecutor can amply prove.

Stipulations are particularly advisable when there is a risk that the prosecution’s proof will incidentally introduce some prejudicial matter. For example, counsel should consider stipulating (1) the fact of death in a homicide case, to avoid gruesome photographs and medical testimony (*see, e.g.,* Jessica M. Salerno, *Seeing Red: Disgust Reactions to Gruesome Photographs in Color (but not in Black and White) Increase Convictions*, 23 (No. 3) PSYCHOLOGY, PUBLIC POLICY, AND LAW 336-50 (2017)); (2) the identity of a stolen object, to avoid its identification by a sympathetic theft complainant who has no other testimony pertinent to the case; (3) the authenticity of prosecution exhibits, to avoid chain-of-custody testimony resulting in a parade of police witnesses testifying with crackerjack efficiency that may appear to characterize the entire police investigation; and (4) the qualifications of prosecution experts, if they are impressive.

Stipulations can also be used to improve counsel’s position on certain evidentiary objections. For example, when counsel objects to an item of prosecution evidence on the ground that its prejudicial impact substantially outweighs its probative value (*see* § 36.2.3 *supra*), counsel can reduce its probative value by announcing that s/he will stipulate the fact which the item is being offered to prove. *See, e.g., Old Chief v. United States*, 519 U.S. 172 (1997); *People v. Walker*, 211 Ill. 2d 317, 328-43, 812 N.E.2d 339, 345-53, 285 Ill. Dec. 519, 525-33 (2004); *State v. Alvarez*, 318 N.J. Super. 137, 150-54, 723 A.2d 91, 97-99 (1999).

Obtaining the prosecutor’s stipulation to factual elements in the defense case will enable counsel to save the time and trouble of seeking out, preparing, and examining witnesses on incontestable points. *Cf.* § 36.3.2.2 concluding paragraph *supra*. For example, if the prosecutor is willing to stipulate to the accuracy and authenticity of defense counsel’s transcript of a police radio communications tape, counsel can forgo testimony by the police communications personnel who recorded the tape and by the individual who transcribed it. Counsel does well to seek stipulations to the admissibility of items of defense evidence (*see, e.g., Pittman by Hamilton v. County of Madison, Illinois*, 863 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 2017)) unless, by so doing, s/he is likely to alert the prosecutor to potential objections that the prosecutor is otherwise likely to overlook. When a prosecutor who is cooperative in matters of this kind requests reciprocal stipulations to incontrovertible or unimportant points in the prosecution’s case or to the admissibility of

unobjectionable items of prosecution evidence, counsel should ordinarily agree, both in order to maintain the prosecutor's cooperation and in order to avoid irritating the judge by appearing to be wasting the court's time in taking testimony on facts that could have been stipulated.

36.7.2. *Stipulated Trials*

Counsel may, on occasion, wish to waive a full evidentiary trial and to submit the case to the judge in a bench trial on an agreed statement of facts or on the police report or on the transcript of the preliminary hearing or of a pretrial hearing on a motion to suppress. This procedure is called a "stipulated trial" in some jurisdictions, a "trial on a case-stated basis" in others.

The procedure is useful in cases in which there is no real factual dispute and the only matters in controversy are legal – the interpretation of an unclear rule of law or the application of an established rule to a novel set of facts. Thus, for example, in a case in which both parties agree that the defendant cursed at a police officer who was engaged in his or her official duties but the parties disagree about whether these facts make out the crime of obstruction of governmental administration, counsel might offer to stipulate the facts and argue only the legal issue. The judge will ordinarily appreciate the time and trouble saved and may reflect his or her appreciation at sentencing in the event that the defendant is convicted.

In jurisdictions in which a pretrial suppression ruling cannot be reviewed on appeal following the accused's entry of a guilty plea (see §§ 14.8, 24.8 fourth paragraph *supra*) the stipulated trial procedure may offer advantages comparable to those of a guilty plea while preserving the defendant's right to appellate review of the suppression ruling. Because the stipulated trial process saves the prosecutor's and the judge's time, the prosecutor will often be amenable to offering sentencing concessions similar to those s/he would make in exchange for a guilty plea (prosecutorial support for a sentence of probation, or whatever), and the judge will tend to be more lenient at sentencing. Yet because the stipulated trial is technically a "trial," any errors in the pretrial suppression ruling are preserved for appeal.

There may be additional reasons for the stipulated trial procedure in particular cases. A police report may contain inadmissible matter favorable to the defendant or may reflect the investigating officer's sympathy for the defendant; the transcript of a preliminary hearing may contain similarly inadmissible defense matter or a fatal defect in the prosecution testimony. When stipulating to trial on a prior transcript, counsel should make clear whether the parties are agreeing that the court may consider everything in the transcript or only the evidence presented there that would be admissible under the evidentiary rules applicable at trial. *Cf. Moore v. United States*, 429 U.S. 20 (1976) (per curiam).